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PREFACE
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau pointed out in 1968 that some
seventy percent of Canadian foreign policy is directly affected by the
relationship of Canada and the United States.

Trudeau expressed hope

that ways could be found to derive maximum independence from the re
maining thirty percent.

At the same time, Trudeau pointed out the

need to decrease the presence of the United States in Canada's foreign
policy.

One of the ways Trudeau proposed to meet these objectives was

the expanded use of countervailing forces.

Since the time of this

statement, Trudeau has turned words to actions, seeking a wider diver
sification of Canada's contacts.
This paper will examine the use of the countervailing force as a
political concept in Canadian foreign policy.

The hypothesis to be

evaluated contends that Canada attempts to use countervailing forces
against the influence and pressure of the United States, and by doing
so, expands its ability to pursue its own distinct foreign policy.
Several questions must be answered.

How extensive is the in

fluence of the U.S. on Canadian policy-making?

What forms and

structures do U.S. influences assume to have an effect on Canadian
politics?

What are the countervailing forces implemented by Canada?

How, as political and economic concepts, are they functional?

Do they

serve their purpose?
The relationship of Canada and the United States is a particularly
well-suited ground on which to observe the operation of this concept.
The U.S. and Canada share many projects and cooperative efforts, but
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the size and greater human resources clearly conspire to make the U.S.
the dominant partner in any cooperative venture.

The economic power of

the United States further buttresses the preponderance of the U.S. in
a very extensive economic relationship with Canada.
The larger, more advanced military establishment and the
assumption of global responsibilities contribute further to enhancing
the preponderance of the U.S., not only vis-a-vis Canada, but the
Western Hemisphere as well.
Canada, more than any other nation in the Western hemisphere,
feels the effects of living next door to a giant.

Canada has a common

border with the U.S. of about four thousand miles and both nations
speak, for the most part, the same language.
Since 1867, questions have been repeated raised as to whether
Canada is sovereign in some aspects.

One of the major catalysts for

this questioning is the economic relationship between the two nations.
As industrialization proceeded in the U.S., the economic web between
the U.S. and Canada was spun, thus subjecting Canada to economic links
with the U.S.

Since this time, about 1880, Canadians have searched

for ways to minimize the greater influence of the United States so
that decision-making in Canadian foreign policy might reflect more the
goals and aspirations of the Canadian people.
To make a complete and extensive analysis, several methodologies
will be implemented.

Through a historical survey of U.S.-Canadian

relations within the global context, persistant characteristics of the
relationship will be identified and related to the hypothesis.
Specifically, these characteristics will stem from the pressure of the
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U.S., the Canadian response, and those global developments which have
foisted change upon the U.S. and Canadian political systems.
The study will also direct itself to those forces within Canada
which tend to lessen the influence of the U.S.

The existence of a

large French speaking group in Canada frustrates the English influence
of the U.S., for example.

Canada's use of counterweights in specific

areas of the world will constitute the final analysis of the study.

The

counterweight policy, its intention, and a measure of its success will
be discussed.

From the accumulation of data, a conclusion as to the

validity of the hypothesis will be drawn.
The primary source material used consists of the Trudeau adminis
tration's review of foreign policy published by the Department of
External Affairs.

Other data comes from the Canadian-American Committee

and the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C.

The secondary source

material are scholarly works and studies available at Waldo Library at
Western Michigan University, the University of Michigan Library, the
University of Windsor Library, and the Algoma College Library.

CHAPTER I
Themes of Canadian Foreign Policy
A significant theme in Canadian history is the pressure the
divided provinces felt from their dynamic neighbor to the south, the
United States.

From the time of the American Revolution, Canadians

were a threatened populace.

Resisting American invasions in the

Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, the Canadian people learned
early in their national existence to keep a wary eye on the activities
of the U.S.

Pressure from the U.S. and its constant clamoring for

annexation of the Canadian provinces lent impetus to those in Canada
who wished for a unification of the provinces under one government.
A Canadian historian, Mason Wade notes
1 837

1

four instances between

and 1859 when border incidents nearly led to armed conflict

between the Canadian provinces and the U.S. American sympathizers had
interferred in a series of Canadian rebellions in 1837-38.

Aroostock

County in Maine was the scene of clashes involving ax-wielding lumber
jacks from New Brunswick and Maine.
1 846

Drawing a boundary in Oregon in

brought out heated discussions and threats between the two

principals.

The Fenians, a group of Irish-Americans, carried out

raids from New England on the Canadian provinces as a means of
striking at Great Britain for not granting Irish independence.

1

The

Mason, Wade, "The Roots of the Relationship", The United States
and Canada, Edited by John Sloan Dickey, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), p. 40.
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Fenians were active through the Civil War and they were not whole
heartedly restrained by the American government.

In the post-Civil

War era, there was an outcry in the U.S. for an invasion of the
Canadian provinces to punish Britain for its role in assisting the
rebellious southern states.

These demands blended into a chorus of

American voices proclaiming their "manifest destiny"
control over the North American continent.

to extend their

The statements and actions

of public officials lent a great deal of credibility to the American
threat in the minds of Canadians.
In 1867, the year of Canadian confederation, the U.S. Secretary
of State, William H. Seward, a longtime advocate of annexation, told
a Boston audience that, "Nature designs that this whole continent
shall be sooner or later within the magic circle of the American
Union.112

Just one year prior to the establishment of the

Canadian confederation, U.S. Senator from Michigan, Zachariah
Chandler, and U.S. Representative N.P. Banks, Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, sponsored a bill which would have allowed
for the Canadian provinces to join the American Union upon request.
In 1867, Canadians were sufficiently impressed with the American
threat to forget those differences which kept them divided.
agreed to consolidate into a federal government.

They

The move for

federation of the Canadian provinces was led by a group of people
interested in avoiding political union with the United States.

The

actual federation was proclaimed by the British Parliament, through
2 Seward's remarks are quoted by Mason Wade, ibid.
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the passage of the British North American Act which defined the
working of the Canadian political system.

The British North American

Act subsequently became the constitution of Canada.

The Treaty of

Paris, signed by the U.S. in 1871, acknowledged the ties of Canada to
Great Britain and recognized the fact that the majority of the
Canadian people were opposed to annexation or political union with
their southern neightbor.

Thus, Canadian survival in these early days

was guaranteed by the maintenance of the imperial connection with
Britain.

Mildred Swartz points out the intentions of the Canadian

founding fathers in regard to Britain and the United States:
Canada was a conscious rebuff to the
American experience and a deliberate
continuation of the British connection
and its political traditions.3
By uniting themselves and solidifying their ties with England,
the Canadians began the use of counterweights as a new nation.
This marks the first phase.

Canada sought her survival by be

coming an intricate part of the British security system.

Canada's

role within the British security system mandated her contributions
of men and materials to the Allies in World War I.
allies of the United States and Canada.

The war also made

Despite this, Canada remained

under the British security umbrella, carrying out a foreign policy
through British offices.
In 1931, the British Parliament passed the Statute of Westminster

3 Mildred Swartz, "American Influence on the Conduct of Canadian
Politics," from The Influence of the United States on Canadian
Development, Edited by RichardPreston, (Durham: Duke Un. Press,
1972), p. 99.
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which extended full diplomatic freedom to the Canadian policy.
The act in effect recognized Canada as an equal to Britain, capable
of carrying out its own activities.

At the same time, the Statute

of Westminster assured that Canada would continue a close association
with Britain through the Commonwealth.

This watershed in Canadian

British relations ended the very close association and cooperation
that had underwritten Canadian survival.
In the years 1936-38, Canada, responding to President Franklin
Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy," entered into a series of defense
talks with the United States.

Basically, the two leaders, Mackenzie

King and Roosevelt committed themselves to mutual defense in the face
of the rising Nazi threat.

At the outbreak of World War II, Canada

again followed Britain's lead into the war, rather than the U.S.
which decided to remain officially neutral in the early days of the
war.
In the aftermath of World War II, Canada emerged as an in
fluential member of the world community.

The traditional great powers

of Europe lay in war-devastated ruins as did the Asian power, Japan.
Canada entered this period with high hopes for international
cooperation for peace.
Canadian foreign policy:

This marks the beginning of a second phase in
that of internationalism.

The foundations

for this phase was laid by the destruction of Europe and the rise of
the so-called Third World nations, which emerged from the crumbled
colonial empires.
nations.

Canada used her influence to speak for the emerging

This role was well-suited for Canada because there was no

record of imperialism or colonialism.

8

Of particular interest to the Canadian internationalist position
was the idea of developing a strong, viable United Nations, capable
of dealing effectively and efficiently with global problems.

Be-

cause of her bilingual nature, Canada was able to maintain communica
tions with the English speaking Commonwealth and French speaking
developing nations.

In the internationalist phase, Canada perceived

her purpose as trying to organize the world community with full
international participation and cooperation.

Canada's initiatives in

this endeavor drew largely on the philosophy of one of her leading
diplomats, Lester B. Pearson.

Pearson's work on behalf of the U.N. is

strongly characterized by diligence, patient understanding, and a
stunning anticipation of developments in international politics.
Pearson, for example, opposed the veto power of the powerful nations
in the Security Council of the U.N., pointing out that the veto
potentially could cripple the Council from effective action.

He sought

to strengthen the General Assembly by involving the Third World
nations to reflect a more universal view of policy-making.

Pearson

also strongly believed in the use of peacekeeping forces, and Canada
maintains a portion of her military for this purpose.
Canada's idealism and high hopes for global cooperation received
a stunning blow by the outbreak of the Cold War.

The threats, con

flicts, and jockeying for power in the Cold War helped bring about the
end of Canada's internationalist approach.

Another

factor working

toward the same end was the decline in Canadian influence due to the
reviving European nations and Japan.

The initial blows, however, to

Canada's idealism stemmed directly from the outbreak of the Cold War.

9

Several incidents contributed to Canada's changing outlook.

After

the U.N. conferences in San Francisco, Soviet pressure on East
Europe steadily mounted, with several East European nations succumbing
to the pressure and falling behind the Iron Curtain.

Canada was

anxious for the recovery of the West European markets so that the
beneficial economic ties could be restored and so that the traditional
European counterweight to the U.S. might stand intact.

The recovery

was frustrated by European Corrnnunist parties under the direction of
the Kremlin.

In 1945, the defection of Igor Gouzenko, a cypher clerk

in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa brought the Cold War into Canada.
Gouzenko turned over evidence of a Soviet spy ring operating in
Canada.

This disheartening development was complemented by a strong

anti-Communist stand taken by the Roman Catholic Church.

Canada's

Catholic population was concentrated in French Quebec, and the premier
of Quebec, Maurice Duplesses frequently charged the federal government
with being soft on Communism.
Clearly, by 1947, the attitudes of the Canadian leadership had
changed.

A statement by Louis St. Laurent, the Prime Minister, gives

ample testimony to the charge:
If theory crazed totalitarian groups persist
much longer in their policies of futility and
frustration, we will not very much longer allow
them to prevent us from using our obvious ad
vantages to improve the conditions of those who
wish to cooperate with us and thereby overcome
the difficulties we ourselves are experiencing
and the normal exchange of specialized servic�s
between nations and their respective peoples.
4 Premier St. Laurent's statement is quoted by F.H. Soward and
Edwar Mcinnis, in Canada and the United Nations, (New York: Manhatten
Publishing Co., 1956), p.�.--
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Such a statement was indicative of the growing consensus for an
alliance based upon collective security among the Western European
and North American nations to meet and blunt Soviet pressure.

By 1949

the organization became a reality in the form of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.

The alliance was well-suited for Canada, for it

saw Canada's parent nations, Britain and France unified in the same
effort.

Thus, NATO was useful in promoting consensus in foreign policy

among Canada's two main ethnic groups.

The entrance into NATO saw

Canada take a step back from the internationalist phase and turn in the
direction of a more regionalist approach.

But defense, and a con

sensus at home were not the only reasons why Canada embraced NATO
membership.

Thomson and Swanson of the Center for Canadian Studies

at John Hopkins University made note of a third reason:
The prospect of a North Atlantic alliance
was of more interest to Canada than merely
to stem Communist expansion; it held the
hope of forming an Atlantic Community.
During World War II and afterward, the con
cept of the British Empire and subsequently,
the Commonwealth, as a counterweight to
American influence gave way to that of an
Atlantic Community. . .5
The reasons mentioned enabled Canada's support of NATO to be most
enthusiastic.

In the first eight years of NATO, Canada contributed

nearly 13 billion, an armored brigade of 6500 men, 20 air squadrons,
and training for thousands of airmen from other member nations.
Canada participated in the Korean War and the Suez Crisis through
5

D.C. Thomson and R.F. Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy:
Options and Perspectives, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. 1971),
p. 27.
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the contributions of troops to peacekeeping forces, but her regional
approach was becoming more pronounced as she entered into a series of
cooperative defense projects with the U.S.

Among these was the North

American Air Defense agreement.
Defense cooperation with the United States was helpful to the
Canadian nation, but it also carried the threat of the diminution of
Canadian sovereignty due to her participation with the world's most
dynamic and influential nation.

In addition, Canada was beset by a

domestic crisis in the early 1960 1 s in which the status of Quebec was
to set off constitutional debates over the power of the Canadian provinces vis-a-vis the federal government.

The traditional fear of the

U.S. and the domestic crisis turned Canadians inward.

They began to

question their national purpose and to assess their capabilities.
The election of Pierre Trudeau brought a more nationalist phase into
Canada's relations with the world in general and the United States in
particular.

The stage had been set in the 1960's and now the Trudeau

government showed definite signs of reflecting a nationalist approach
to international affairs.

Such a policy did not completely obliterate

the characteristics of the internationalist or regionalist phase, since
Canada retained strong commitments in both approaches.

The Trudeau

government carried out an extensive review of Canadian foreign policy
and articulated the aims of a more nationalist approach:
Much of Canada's effort internationally
will be directed to bringing about the
kinds of situations, developments, and
relationships, which will be most favorable
to the furtherance of Canadian interests
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and values.

6

Implicit within this nationalist approach was the continuing need to
minimize the threat of U.S. influence to Canadian sovereignty.

By

reflecting the concerns and aspirations of Canadians in their foreign
policy content, the differences from the United States would become
more sharply defined.
Canada's foreign policy, as it progresses in this phase, will
come to reflect more and more a relevance to domestic interests and
beliefs.

The attempts of Ottawa in the 1960's to strengthen the

links with the French speaking nations of the world is an excellent
illustration of Canadian foreign policy responding to domestic
realities.

The bilingual nature of the Canadian nation will be re

flected through contacts with the Commonwealth and Francophonie
groupings, both of which may serve as multilateral countervailing
forces to the U.S. presence and influence.
Another reality appearing in the formulation of policy is the
fear of the diminution of Canadian sovereignty through cultural and
economic instrusions into Canada on the part of the U.S.

In an array

of influences emanating back and forth across the border, Canadians
are particularly susceptible as Canadian sociologist Everett C.
Hughes points out:
When at home the average Canadian appears
to live about 50 miles from the endless
border. The average American citizen lives
hundreds of miles from it. One-fifth of
6

The Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for
Canadians, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), p. 11.
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all Canadians live in Montreal and
Toronto, which are almost on the
border; add Vancouver, Winnipeg,
Windsor, and Hamilton--all close to
the border--and one has caught over
5 million of the Canadians, between
one-third and one quarter of all of
them. 7
A Canadian assessment of themselves brings to the forefront
their differences from the U.S. as a polity and a people.

If a more

nationalist line is to be followed, then quite clearly Canadian
foreign policy will reflect a divergence from the U.S. in as much as
it takes to reflect the domestic determinants of Canadian foreign
policy.

The nationalist view then rallies to the protection of

Canadian independence. As the analysis will later attempt to show,
this nationalist phase answers to the growing sentiments of the
Canadian people.

Canadian assessments of their position vis-a-vis

the United States will become a part of domestic and foreign policy.
In the summary of the Canadian responses to the U.S. and the
world community, there are roughly four identifiable phases:

the

British imperial connection, which afforded security for the infant
Canadian nation, the internationalist phase, the regional phase, and
finally the nationalist phase which is the current expression.
Canada continues to keep a watchful eye southward and can be counted
upon to adjust to the pressures of the U.S. in a way that will serve
Canadian interests, and to a lesser extent, the greater world
7 Everett C. Hughes, "A Sociologist's View", from The United
States and Canada , Edited by John Sloan Dickey and the American
Assemly(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), p. 12.
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community, but evolution has brought Canadian national interest
and expression to the forefront of policy.

CHAPTER II
Factors Which Tend to Make Canada Dependent on the United States
This chapter will identify and evaluate those factors which have
increased Canada's dependence upon the United States.

Some factors

may decrease the independence of Canada, but this analysis assumes
both to be the same.
Defense
The outbreak of World War II was a major factor in the passing
of Canada from the British to the American security system.

By 1940,

the continental European nations were at the mercy of Hitler's war
machine, while Britain alone prepared to make her stand against the
Nazis.

Canada had shored up British defenses with a steady flow of

war material to the besieged island.

Canada was also able to act as

a funnel to Britain for American assistance as well.

Both North

American nations rose to the occasion when it became clear that
Britain would not be able to stand alone.

An ominous implication

in the North American geopolitical situation was that the fall of
Britain would definitely pose a Nazi threat to the North America.
The industrial potential and the population of the United States
made it the logical leader of the Western world's defense effort.
This situation, in conjunction with the possible domination of Europe
by the Nazis was recognized before the war by the Canadian and
American governments.

Franklin Roosevelt and Mackenzie King met in
15
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1938 to discuss a cooperative defense effort.

As John Holmes

points out:
The principles of the new relationship
can be traced to Mr. Roosevelt's state
ment in 1938 that the United States would
not stand idly by if Canada were threatened
and Mr. King's reciprocal pledge that the
United States was not attacked through or
across Canadian soil.l
When efforts were undertaken to channel assistance to Britain,
Canada and the United States jointly created the Permanent Joint
Board on Defense in 1940.

The Board pertained to the defense of the

North American continent and provided for high level steady con
sultations between the two nations.

This development was followed,

a year later, by an agreement between Canada and the United States
to coordinate production of war materials in 1941.

Thus, Canada

passed from the British security system to a stage where she
coordinated her efforts with those of the United States.

Holmes

notes that the relationship was voluntary:
The defense partnership was never forced
on an unwilling Canada and in the field
of defense production, it was we (Canadians)
who always took the initiative because it
has always been to our economic advantage
to do so.2
The cooperative relationship changed to an integrative rela
tionship with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1 John Holmes, "Canada and the United States: Political and
Security Issues", Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3, (1970),
p. 400.
2

Ibid.
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in 1949.

Within NATO, Canadian troops were to be commanded by an

American general.

The integration of the armed forces was further

facilitated by the outbreak of the Korean war.
A Canadian Colonel, C.P. Stacey points out:
The prolonged Korean crisis of 1950-53
was something of a turning point in
Canadian-American military relations.
In the course of it, indeed, the Canadian
army seems to have come close to being
completely Americanized. Late, in 1950,
the Department of National Defense announced
the army was to adopt armaments and vehicles
of the United States type in order to facili
tate industrial mobilization on the basis of
North American-made equipment. 3
Thus, with NATO there was an integration of command and personnel, but the Korean war saw an integration of equipment.
In 1958, the air defenses of Canada and the United States were
integrated in the North American Air Defense agreement.

The air

defenses of both nations were integrated into a cooperative scheme
commanded by an American or by a Deputy Canadian who assumes total
control in the absence of the American connnander.

The U.S. assumed

approximately 90 percent of the costs of the NORAD arrangements and
there was evidence that Canada's industrial commitment by be over
whelmed by the American presence.
In 1959, the Canadians had perfected what they believed to be
an efficient military fighter aircraft, the CF Arrow.
believed the jet fighter was the best in its class.

3

Indeed, they
The United States,

C.P. Stacey, "Twenty-one Years of Canadian-American Military
Cooperation, 1940-61", In Canada-United States Treaty Relation, Edited
by David R. Deener (Denham: Duke University Press, 1963 ), pp. 113 -114.
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however, would not consider a place for the CF Arrow, thus causing
the Canadian Government to cancel the contract.

The effects of the

cancellation were most disgruntling, as Colonel Stacey notes:
The cancellation of the contract threw
14,000 people out of work and newspaper
reports said that the final number affected
might be as many as thirty thousand • • .
This dramatic affair made it painfully clear
to the Canadian public that in the future,
Canada whether she liked it or not was likely
to be militarily dependent on the United
States to an extent unknown.4
The situation was futher irritated when as John Holmes observes:
Production (of the CF Arrow) was stopped
and hundreds of Canada's best technical
experts left for California. It was a
traumatic experience and a mood of hope
lessness about Canada's industrial and
military prospects settled on the land. 5
Thus, Canada, when unable to continue without U.S. support, was
forced to cancel a project which provided employment to thousands
and gave a sense of purpose not only to technical and military
experts but to the nation as a whole.

It led to observations by a

former minister of defense that the cost of developing independent
weapons systems prohibited Canada from providing her own share.
A remedy designed to restore Canada's confidence and participa
tion was then conceived by the two governments.

A 1959 agreement was

called the Defense Production Sharing Agreement, and was designed to
increase Canadian participation in defense production.
4 Ibid., p. 116.

However, it

5 John Holmes, "Canada in Search of It's Role", Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 4 1, (July 1963), pp. 661-662.
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also integrated Canada even further into North American defense.
Peter C. DObell, who served sixteen years as a Canadian diplomat,
points out the details of the new agreement:
The United States agreed to waive customs
duties and the application of the Buy
American Act to Canada, giving Canadian
manufacturers an equal chance to bid
against U.S. domestic producers for mili
tary contracts.6
The defense production program has been remarkably successful
from the Canadian point of view.

Since 1959, when the program first

went into effect, more than 300 Canadian firms have done over $605
million in defense production most of which was made possible by the
agreement.

7

Thus, in a period of over twenty-five years, developments have
conspired to integrate Canada into the North America Defense scheme.
In a three phase process, passing from the British security system,
coordination with American efforts, and finally integration with
American efforts, the Canadian military establishment has become
very dependent upon the dominant American partner.

The political

implications of this integration are recognized by more and more
Canadians as a threat to Canadian sovereignty.

Colonel Stacey notes

the dilemma faced by Canadians today:
6 Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles, (London: The
Royal Institute of International Affairs and Oxford University Press,
1972), p. 79.

7

James Eayrs, "Sharing a Continent: The Hard Issues", froni
The United States and Canada, Edited by John Slonn Pickey and the
American Assembly.--(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1964),
p. 68.
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She (Canada) is sympathetic to Uncle
Sam's international aims and in all
circumstances the military alliance
between the two was probably inevitable.
But today, she finds that alliance tending
to become more and more constricting at a
time when Canada herself is in a more and
more independent mood.8
Due to the highly integrated defense structure and Canada's
dependence upon it, purely independent military action by Canada
seems out of the question without some form of prior consultation
with the United States.

The dependence provides the U,S. With

instruments with which Canada can be persuaded to follow a certain
policy, as in the case of China.9
The situation thus centers on the willingness of the U.S. to
see Canada pursue an independent military policy.

The means for

domination rest in the hands of the U.S. and to those means, Canada
must pay considerable attention in the formulation of foreign policy.
The problem of the Canadian dilemma was articulated by D.C.
Thomson and R.F. Swanson of the Center for Canadian Studies at John
Hopkins University.

The two scholars point out that:

The challenge is to devise a military
policy between these two extreme positions
(military integration and military inde
pendence) that will assure national
security against a threat from outside
North America and maximize national
sovereignty within it.10
8

C.P. Stacey, "Twenty-one Years of Canadian-American Military
Cooperation, 1940-61" from Canada-United States Treaty Relations,
Edited by David R. Deener (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963), p. 120.
9 See Chapter IV
lO D.C. Thomson and R.F. Swanson, .2.E..· cit., p. 134.
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Economic Affairs
As in the case of military security, the war devastated island
of Great Britain was unable to administer its empire economically.
As Table I shows, from 1930 to the present the United States filled
the vacuum left by Britain.

In the years 1959-63 the table shows an

increase of $4,662 million of U.S. dollars pouring into Canada while
the British increase is $132 million.

In 1970, sixty-five percent of

Canada's exports went to the U.S. while seventy-two percent came
from the U.S.

Thomson and Swanson note that in addition to trading

patterns, U.S. investment in Canada is tremendous as well.
The economic development of Canada over
the past thirty years has been achieved
in large part because of American in
vestments which make up 82 percent of
foreign owned capital in Canada or over
34 billion dollars,ll
Such a high degree of economical interdependence has a great
many implications for the economic and political relationships between
the United States and Canada.

These implications will continue to

develop as the increase of the U.S. in Canadian economic life
continues.

The Department of External affairs affirms this view in

the document, Foreign Policy for Canadians:
This ascendancy will continue to have
heavy impact on Canada with political,
economic and social implications. The
dependence of Canadian private industry
and some government programs on United
States techniques and equipment (not to
mention capital) will continue to be a
11 D.C. Thomson and R.F. Swanson,££_, cit., p. 135.

22
12
fact of life.
One such implication is the direction of Canadian trade.

Trade

can be a very useful way of maintaining communication with other
nations, especially these nations with whom reconcilation or
detente is sought.

Trade for Canada, as was noted earlier, is

largely with the U.S. due to the high degree of economic interde
pendence.

A government study of the economic interdependence notes

the following in regard to Canadian-American trade:
Foreign control seems to influence the
formulation of trade policy in three
ways. First, because of the propensity
for intra-affiliate trade to grow rela
tive to arm's length trade it seems to
influence trade pattern. It seems to
re-enforce the already strong trend
toward North-South trade. If foreign
direct investment in Canada were more
diversified, trade patterns would
probably be more diversified. Secondly,
foreign control has an influence on the
freedom of subsidiaries to procure and
export. Finally, of course, careful
attention is given to the representatives
of domestic industry in formulating trade
strategy. Many of the firms are sub
sidiaries. Their views are either based
on the position of their arents or at
least consistent with it. 5

1

Canadian trade strategy is consequently so oriented to the
extensive economic relationships with the United States, Canada's
freedom to re-orient trade patterns seems to be clearly in doubt.
12 Honorable Mitchell Sharp and Department of External Affairs,
Foreign Policy for Canadians, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada
1970), p. 23.
13

Honorable Herbert Gray, "Domestic Control of the National
Economic Environment", in Canadian Forum, Vol. LI, No. 611, (1971),
p . 3 4.
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TABLE I
Foreign Capital Invested in Canada13
(Millions of Dollars)

1 959

1963

7,259

1 5,826

20,488

1,750

1,778

3 ,1 99

3 ,3 31

3 52

440

1 .8 32

2, 384

19 3 0

1945

1951

U.S.

4,660

4,990

Britain

2,766
188

Others

13 G. Craig, The United States and Canada, (Cambridge:
UN. Press, 1968), p. 462.
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TABLE II
Control of Selected Canadian Industries, 1963

14

Percentage Controlled By--Industry

Canada

Beverages

83

17

0

3

90

7

Textiles

80

13

7

Pulp and Paper

53

35

12

Rubber

The U.S.

Other

Agricultural Machinery

so

so

Automobiles and Parts

3

97

0

Transportation Equipment

22

33

45

Iron and Steel Mills

86

2

12

Electrical Apparatus

23

66

11

Chemicals

22

54

24

Petroleum and
Natural Gas

26

62

12

Smelting and Refining
of non-ferrous ores

49

51

0

Qher mining

38

52

7

Total

36

52

12

14John Redekop (Ed.) The Star Spangled Beaver, (Toronto:
Martin Associates, Ltd.1971), p. 168.

0
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What is the extent of .American control of Canadian industry?

Table

II shows that U.S. fiTII+S control more than half of what may be termed
important industries such as the automobile industry, chemicals,
mining, minerals, and smelting industries.

The table shows the U.S.

firms controlling 52% of the total industries listed.

Since that

figure constitutes over half of the Canadian basic industries, the
position of .American business becomes paramount in Canadian economic
planning.

Peter Newman notes that this situation will continue and

probably intensify due to the fact that the U.S. has poured $3
billion into Canada since 1945 16 , reducing Canadians in Newman's
words,

II

11 17
. 1 categories.
to hold.ing squatters rig
. hts .in most in
. dustria
.

Clearly then, a great deal of Canada's basic industries are con
trolled by .American business firms.

This has been made largely

possible due to the development of the multinational corporation.

A

typical multinational corporation of the United States has its main
headquarters located within the United States and its subsidiaries in
whatever countries its area of manufacturing or production is suit
able.

The importance of this type of economic penetration was recogni

zed in the foreign policy review when it observed that the "inter
nationalization of industry largely in the form of multinational
corporation appears a firm feature of the future economic scene.
16 Peter Newman, "The Thawing of Canada", Atlantic Community
Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2(1971), p. 223.
17 Ibid,

18

(Ottawa:

Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadtan's,
Queen's P;i:-inter fo:i;- Canada)? 1970, p. 24.
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The most outstanding implication of the multinational corporation
is that the parent company exercises control over the subsidiary.
What regulations restrain the parent company may also regulate the
subsidiary regardless of whether or not those regulations are relevant.
The essential question is how do multinational corporations and the
large degree of United States ownership affect Canadian policymaking?
There are numerous investigations by the Canadian government
attempting to discern the extent of American ownership and the impact
this ownership has on policymaking.

The impact on Canada does not

lend itself to defined concepts or precise figures.

Instead, the

committees have found that American ownership shapes the environment
and in specific policies, may cause an alteration or cancellation of
some policies.

The Gray Report, investigating control of Canada's

national economic environment, notes the effects of U.S. direct investment.
Nonetheless, U.S. investment has been on
influential factor in shaping the general
environment within Canada--the environment
within which national identity and interests
have been perceived and articulated and
more particularly, in which foreign policy
has been formulated.19
Th� report goes on to note more specific ways in wh ich Canadian
policymaking can be affected:
The impact of foreign business control
on the conduct of Canadian foreign re
lations is both direct and indirect.
Direct influence is felt generally in
the implementation of foreign economic
policy. The impact of foreign direct
l9 Honorable Herbert Gray, "Domestic Control of the National
Economic Environment", Canadian Forum, Vol. LI, No. 611, (1971), p. 34.
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investment is also indicated through
the image of Canada abroad and views
that others have of this country in
the degree and concentration of foreign
ownership of Canadian industry. This
image affects the position other
countries adopt toward Canada in ne
gotiations and actordingly the Canadian
capacity to realize policy obligations.20
So, Canada's image becomes directly affected by foreign owner
ship.

But other means of influence exist as well.

The most striking

example of the U.S. affecting Canadian through the highly

inter

dependent economic relationship is the extraterritorial application
of U.S. trading law and policy to .American firms operating in Canada.
Specifically, this has involved the United States Trading with the
Enemy Act of 1917.

This act allows the President or his nominee to

investigate and if necessary, to bring charges against an offending
company.

An example of this act being applied to Great Britain, where

U.S. investment is considerably less than in Canada and thus when U.S.
control would be expected to be less effective, comes from C.S.
Burchill:
In December, 1961, six Viscount airliners
were sold by a British firm for delivery
in China. Part of the navigational equip
ment of these machines was manufactured by
Standard Telephone and Cabbs, a British firm
owned and controlled by International
Telephone and Telegraph of New York. Although
the equipment had been designed and produced
in a British factory and not under any U.S.
patent or license, the U.S. Holding Company,
under pressure from the State Department
forbade its British subsidiary to provide
20 Ibid, p. 34.
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any equipment for anr aircraft
destined for China.2
In a situation where U.S. investment, ownership, and control is
significantly lower, the power of the multinational corporation pre
vailed over British trading policy.
In Canada's case, where U.S. investment,_ ownership and control
is significant, the application of the U.S. Trading with the Enemy
Act has been frequent.

The Gray Report gives several examples:

There are a number of individual
examples where U.S. export Control
Regulations have impeded Canadian
exports--eg. sale of an oil gathering
system to the USSR; sale of a heavy
water plant to Reumania; the sale of
a microwave system to Czechoslavakia.22
Further examples come from a study by I.A. Litvak and C.J. Maule,
who cited three examples; one, the prohibiting of a deal between Ford
of Canada and China in which vehicles were to be sold to the Chinese.
Two, the Aluminum Company of Canada, declined a one million dollar
deal with the Chinese due to fears of U.S. protectionist sentiments.
Three, in January 1959, B.F. Goodrich was restrained from carrying
out a conveyer belt deal with the Chinese.23
After the Ford deal, President Eisenhower affirmed that Canadian
law shall govern and Canadian wishes shall be inspected.

But another

example comes to attention a few years later, this time the deal is
21 C.S. Burchill, "Multinational Corporations", Queen's Quarterly,
Vol. LXXVVI, No. 1, (1970), p. 8.
22
23

Department of External Affairs,££.· cit., p. 26.

I.A. Litvak and C.J. Maule, "Conflict Resolution and Extraterritoriality", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 13, No. 3, (1969)
p. 394.
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again with China and again the U.S. successfully obstructs a Canadian
Chinese wheat deal.

Former Prime Minister John Diefenbacher, who was

closely associated with the experience, recounts:
.when the Canadian Government decided
to approve the sale of wheat to Communist
China on credit terms, so strong was the
opposition to Canada's policy that the
Kennedy administration endeavoured to pre
vent a Canadian corporation whose parent
company was in the United States from
supplying Canada with the necessary leaders
so that the whea could be shipped to
Communist China.2 4
The economic preponderance of the United States, then, limits
Canada's independence in trade and thus in foreign policy in general,
for trade is a stepping stone to closer relations.
The U.S. has, for some time, imposed economic and strategic
embargoes on those nations considered to be enemies.

Michael

Barkway points out how the Canadian people diverge from this point
of view, but nonetheless remained trapped by their economic dependence
on the U.S.:
Economic embargoes based on idealogical
differences appear to Canadians of every
political persuasion to be a sterile and
ultimately self defeating instrument of
policy. Along with every other NATO
country except the U.S., Canada extends
this policy in respect of nonstrategic
goods to mainland China and Cuba. But
Canada's writ does not run with the 45
percent of its manufacturing industry,
nor the 51 percent of its mining and
smelting which is controlled by U.S.
corporations. Unless exempted on an
24 John Diefenbacker, "Across the Border", in The Star Spangel
Beaver, Edited by John Redekop, (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates
Ltd.), 1971, p. 45.
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individual case basis, they are subject
to the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act
and if the· Canadian subsidiary conforms
with Canadian policy its U.S. parent
in the absence of a waiver is liable to
prosecution in the u.s. 25
Canada is, therefore, limited in trade policy by considerations
involving the United States.

The aforementioned relationship allows

for the U.S. to influence Canada's political climate and image abroad
through the trade patterns and foreign investment patterns as
established by multinational corporations.

A third factor which has been alluded to is the simple threat of
U.S. economic retaliation upon Canada should Canada adopt policies of a
radical divergence from the U.S.

Many Canadian statesmen have created

metaphors in which Canadian vulnerability is expressed.
when the U.S. sneezes, Canada catches cold.

One says that

An oft-repeated metaphor,

that of Trudeau; points out that living next to the U.S. is like
sharing a bed with an elephant; Canada is affected by every twitch and
grunt.

However, Canadian vulnerability is perceived more clearly

than any threats of retaliation coming from the U.S.

The U.S. has

expressed concern that Canada should not radically diverge from the
U.S. in policymaking but no actual threats have been issued.

What

worries Canadians, though, is that they are vulnerable to U.S.
economic retaliation and this has the potential effect of restricting
Canada's independence.
25 Michael Barkway, "United States Inyestment in Canada'', from
Neighbors Taken for Granted, Edited by Livingston Merchant, (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger Inc.), 1966, pp. 74-75.
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Canadian vulnerability was dramatically demonstrated by the
imposition of the import surcharge by the Nixon administration in
1971.

Peter Dobell made the following observation:
The Nixon measures made the Canadian
government sharply aware of the extent
of Canadian vulnerability to economic
and fiscal measures taken by Washington
for legitimate internal reasoris.26

Dobell also calculated the possible long-range effects of the
surcharge:
Rough calculations suggested that
40,000-100,000 workers would lose
their jobs if the surcharge remained
in effect for a year which would have
meant up to 1 percent increase in the
already high level of unemployment.2 7
Canada finds herself adversely affected by American economic
measures.

A concerted attempt on the part of Canada to alter

significantly its foreign policy content might bring threats and even
action from an angered U.S.

John Holmes argued this same contention

when he pointed out:
Whether we like it or not--and we
do not--we are vulnerable to American
displeasure. This displeasure is not
likely to take the form of punitive
action or crude reprisal; we would feel
it rather in the drying up of the good
will which restrains the U.S. from ex
ploiting the economic and military
power it has to do us damage.28
26 Peter C. Dobell, £E..· cit., p. 85.
27 Ibid. p. 83.

2 8 John Holmes, "Growing Independence in Canadian-American
Relations", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1, (1967), p. 165.

32
Whether direct action, as in the extraterritorial application of
U.S. trading laws or the adoption of other actions, Canada's inde
pendence in economic affairs is limited by economic integration and
interdependence.

H.G. Thorburn notes the obvious problem:

The result of this (foreign investment)
is to tie the Canadian economy closely
to the American and to shift much of the
decision-making to the United States·
an erosion of national independence.29
The Canadian government has made some moves to lessen their
extreme dependence and limited area for action.
pointed out that the Canadian government. .

Litvok and Maule

" as a result of U.S.

guidelines (Extraterritorial Application of Trading Law), had to
introduce countermeasures or face the prospect of having Canada's
future shaped in Washington.1130

However, because of the high degree of interdependence, trading
laws and Canadian vulnerability, Canada faces the prospect of further
integration and influence.

Otherwise, she must adopt measures to

restrain U.S. penetration if that is possible.

In addition to growing

U.S. investment, other developments may conspire to keep Canada
closely integrated with the U.S.

Joint developmental schemes in

Canada's north in addition to joint ecological plans promise to
keep the relationship close.

The government review of foreign

policy recognizes as a challenge to all Canadians:
29 H.G. Thornburn, "Mr. Gordon's Questions Answered", Canadian
Forum, Vol. XLVII, No. 566, (1968), p. 269.
30

I.A. Litvak and C.J. Maule,�- cit., p. 307.
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--the erosive effect on separate identity
and independence of international activities
and influences, mainly under American
inspiration and direction, in the economic
field (multinational corporations inter
national trade unions). Such activities and
influences have yielded many practical
benefits, but the degree of restriction they
impose on national freedom of action must
be constantly and carefully gauged if
sovereignty, national unity, and separate
identity are to be safeguarded.31
In closing this consideration, trading patterns, direct invest
ment, Canada's vulnerability to U.S. economic measures, and U.S.
influence all have an inhibitive effect upon Canada's freedom to
pursue her own desired policies.
Cultural Affairs
No less than economics, there has been a strong cultural in
fluence exerted on the Canadian people by the United States.

Both

Canada and the U.S. share a frontier tradition and both have grown
up side by side with an array of cultural influences emanating back
and forth across the border.

In addition, there is virtually free

travel across the borders allowing the Canadian and American people
to mingle freely and exchange ideas and traditions.
nations are receptive cultures.

Moreover, both

Since most Canadians live near the

border and since there are greater numbers of media facilities in the
U.S., Canada again becomes the threatened partner in the relationship.
Specifically, it is contended that a massive influx of cultural
influences via the media shapes and molds the general political culture
31

(Ottawa:

Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadian's,
Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), p. 30.
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of a given nation.

This was noted in the government review of

foreign policy which stated:
The cultural influence of the United States
is powerful and pervasive. American per
iodicals and television blanket English
speaking Canada and penetrate deeply into
French-speaking Canada. Cultural attitudes
in the United States are imported into Canada
particularly by the younger generation.
The Gray Report examined book publishing and movies, noting the
high degree of foreign control:
There is high foreign control in industries
which have considerable cultural impact,
such as book publishing and in industries
which are responsible for the dissemination
of culture, such as film and book distri
bution. Foreign control and U.S. control
in particular, is high in those industries
in which taste information, produce inno
vation and differentiation are crucial, such
as automobiles, pharmaceuticals and electrical
products.33
Greater resources in media and the closeness of the Canadian
people to the border already render American influence as predominant,
but in marketing media, American firms have another advantage--that
of greater capital for wider and more extensive exposure of their pro
duct.

A Brief to the Royal Commission on Book Publishing explained

the reason why:
The Canadian Trade publisher serves a smaller
market, produces at a higher cost than his
American counterpart. But the prices he can
obtain for his product are prices determined
by the American market; not the Canadian. As
a result, he operates in an environment of
32 Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians,
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), p. 14.
33 Honorable Herbert Gray,££· cit., p. 17.
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high risk and low return. Since money
managers are disinclined to put patriotism
ahead of profit, it is hardly surprising
that Canadian publishers can't find the
capital they need to survive.34
The ability of American firms to effectively market their pro
ducts has been reflected in the competition with Canadian firms.
The harm for Canadians lies in the viewpoint that they so often are
exposed to.

The viewpoint expressed is not indigenous and often does

not take into account the factors that are relevent or pertinent to
the Canadian people.

A lobbyist group provided the following figures:

In 1959, we bought 147 million copies
of American magazines. Ten years later
the total had declined to 130.5 million
copies. But the decline for Canadian
magazines has been ever steeper. In 1959,
we bought 45 million copies of Canadian
magazines. In 1969, we bought 33.8
million copies,35
Paul Audrey buttresses the contention of the Senate committee
with his similar observation:
In 1969, only 25 percent of the books
published in Canada were Canadian
publications and 80 percent of these
publications were the products of foreign
controlled companies.36
Further evidence suggests that many Canadians listen to American
television and radio.

Everett Hughs observes:

Whatever some Canadians may think of United
States programs, a very large number of

34 Peter Martin, Brief� the Royal Commission on Book Publishing,
(Toronto: Peter Martin Associates Ltd., March, 1971).
35 Report� the Special Senate Committee on the Mass Media, Vol. I
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), p.15�-36

Paul Audrey, "Publishing", Canadian Forum, Vol. LII, No. 626,
(1973), p. 3.

36
Canadians hear and view them in a big way.
In November 1963, three Buffalo affiliates
of United States networks took 43 percent
of the total viewing audience during peak
evening hours in Toronto. United States
stations, presumably those of Seattle took
37 percent of the Vancouver audience in the
same period.37
In addition to these media influences, Canada is a particularly
well-suited nation for influence due to the lack of a strong national
identity as the Gray Report points out:
The lack of a strong national identity and
a distinctive culture tend to create • • .
a vacuum and a greater receptivity to foreign
influence and investment. On this fertile
ground, foreign investment has a relatively
easy task in shaping and influencing the
Canadian environment.38
Canada's receptivity to foreign influence is then increased be
cause she has not developed a strong national identity.

This is

attributed to ethnic divisions and the Canadian mosaic of ethnic
groups.
Education also permits and sometimes encourages U.S. influence
to shape the Canadian environment.
Canada is still widespread.

Use of American textbooks in

In Edmonton, Alberta, a teacher asked

her third graders to do the following assignment:
Write these sentences as a paragraph.
think our flag is beautiful. It has
seven red stripes and six white ones.
It has a field of blue in the corner.

We

37 Everett Hughes, "A Sociologists View" in The United States and
Canada, Edited by John Sloan Dickey and the American Assembly, (Engle
wood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), p. 28.
38
Honorable Herbert Gray,�- cit., p. 17.
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On this field are fifty stars.
Do you know what the flag is
called? 39
This is only one example of Canadian school children receiving
an American education with its potential effects.
In a summary, this chapter has explored in three areas, how
In the area

Canada is receptive and vulnerable to U.S. influence.

of defense, Canada's military is closely integrated with the United
States, depending upon the U.S. for equipment and U.S. support of
defense programs.

In the area of economics, Canada's extreme economic

interdependence was demonstrated, showing how trade patterns orient
Canada even closer to the U.S. and how extraterritorial application
of U.S. trading law limited Canadian freedom to trade with certain
other nations.

Furthermore, in the area of economics, Canada's

vulnerability to U.S. economic policies was shown giving credence to
the idea that the threat of U.S. economic retaliation could be
In the area

sufficient in influencing Canadian political climate.

of cultural influences, Canadian vulnerability was again noted against
greater U.S. resources and capabilities for influence.
In the political climate, one must assume that Canada's depend
ence upon the United States is a formidable factor.

In most cases,

Canada's freedom may be directly related to U.S. discretion and will.
Such an arrangement is not conducive to a more independent Canada.
As long as Canadian dependence remains at such a high level, must of
their sovereignty depends upon the flexibility of the United States.
39

Gary Blonston, "Canada's Agony--Made in U.S.A.", Detroit Free
Press, February 25, 19 73, p. 40.

CHAPTER III
Factors Which Tend to Make Canada Independent of the United States
Different Political Development
The history of two separate political entities developing side
by side is bound to similarities, just as it is bound to differences.
While Canada and the United States may be similar in their North
American pragmatism, their development as people certainly followed
different courses.
The different development of Canadian and American political
systems engenders a need for different means and different goals.
Americans were born of a violent revolution and then developed a
flair for expansion.

A Counselor for Cultural Affairs at the

Canadian Embassy in Washington D.C. notes the difference in national
attitudes and feelings:
There thus developed from earliest times
in the American psyche a spirit of 'taking
things into one's own hands,' a spirit of
adventure and individual initiative, and
a readiness to resort to violence when
it seemed necessary for individual or
national ends."1
The governmental systems are quite different.

The Parliamentary

government emphasizes cooperation between the branches of government
as in Canada, while the Presidential system of the U.S. functions in
a distinctly different manner due to �eparation of powers and the
1

George A. Cowley, "Is Canada Really or For That Matter, Are
Canadians?", Social Education, Vol. 35, No. 6, (1971), p 559-61).
38
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existence of checks and balances, both of which, tend to isolate
the various branches or arms of government.
The developments of the two systems have seen different
approaches to foreign affairs as well.

Canadians tend to emphasize

compromise rather than confrontation.

It should be noted that when

anti-Communist feeling gave a hard line to American foreign policy,
Canadians repeatedly attempted to seek a relaxation of world tensions
through a concilitory approach.

Looking at the developments and

assessing the differences, Paul Martin concluded:
There has emerged a Canadian way of life
allied to yet distinct from that of the
United States. There is a Canadian identity
in areas of culture and tradition and in
concepts of sovereignty.2
The different developments, perceptions, and approaches then,
tend to reinforce the separate national personalities of both nations
and to lay the basis for different roles and aspirations.
The French-Canadian Presence
Canada, like the United States, is a multi-national entity, com
posed mainly of Europeans.

Canada's outstanding characteristic of a

strong concentration of French speaking Canadians.

In a nation of over

20 million, the French account for at least 30 percent of the population, leading Norman Smith to conclude:
This shapes our destiny, whether in terms
of religion, education, foreign policy,
social welfare, national economy, art,
2

Paul Martin, "The American Impact on Canada", The Star Spangled
Beaver, Ed. by John Redekop, (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates Ltd.,
1971), p. 34.
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literature, character, or national pride.
Everything we do or do not do has felt
the impression of our dualism.3
As an uncompromising foe of the Quebec secessionist movement,
Pierre Trudeau has pointed out that the French dimension to the
Canadian personality is the essential element in obstructing the
gravitation of Canada toward the United States·.
Many media influences of the United States are not as likely
to penetrate French Canada as English Canada.

A more aggressive

French-Canadian nationalism has demanded and received French radio
and television broadcasts, through satellite communication as a
means of an overall reaffinnation of the French language and tradition.
A more assertive and at the same time, impatient Quebec has
enticed the federal government to adopt and develop official bilingual
policies domestically as well as in international policy.

This has

not been entirely unwelcome as John Holmes notes:
Give the present relations of Paris with
Washington, this trend has had in it the
possibility of alienation from the U.S.
and it has been particularly welcomed by
those French and English Canadians who
would like Canada to adopt a more Gaullist
style toward the u.s.4
There is evidence, however, that the French presence is not the
blessing that Trudeau made of it.

Two themes have seemed to dominate

3

Norman Smith, "Canadian Sense of Destiny" in Neighbor Taken For
Granted, Edited by Livingston Merchant, (New York, Frederick A. Praeger
Inc., 1966), p. 60.
4

John Holmes, "Growing Independence in Canadian-American Relations",
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1, (1967), p. 159.
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Quebec affairs in the past decade.

One is the recognition that

Quebec should develop to the extent that other provinces have
developed and the other is the campaign for greater independence
from Ottawa.

This may allow for the Quebec leadership to use Ottawa

and Washington against each other to obtain greater independence
vis-a-vis the other provinces.

During Quebec'� period of rapid

development in the mid-196O's, known as the Quiet Revolution, the
newly developed technical and managerial class has recognized the
need for investment.

Robert Gilpin notes in regard to this:

At the same time that English-Canadians
stress the importance of unity against
the threat of American Domination, French
Canadians seek to increase American
investment and their independence to
Ottawa.5
Such an influx of American investment is likely to introduce
the same influential factors that the rest of Canada has experience.
However, the prodominant usage of French is likely to obstruct
American penetration.
If the balance between French language and traditions and a U.S.
investment influx can be maintained so as to promote the French fact
as an intricate part of the Canadian nationality, then the existence
of the French-Canadians will continue to frustrate the gravitation
of English Canada. to the American orbit.
5 Robert Gilpin, "American Direct Investment and Canada's Two
Nationalisms", The Influence of the U.S. on Canadian Development,
Edited by Richard Priston, (Durham: DukeUniversity Press, 1972), p. 125.
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Canadian Nationalism
Canada has never developed a spirit of national feeling in the
same way as have other nations.

Undoubtedly, a great deal of

potential national feeling has been squandered in the ethnic diffi
culties Canada has experienced.

As people come to recognize the

dualist character of the Canadian personality, perhaps ethnic
nationalism will be translated to the energy of purely nationalist
feeling.

Canadian nationalism may be furthered by the presence of

the United States, which by virtue of its size and influence, may
serve as the rally point for both of Canada's main nationalisms.

The

increasing presence of the United States has engendered a nationalist
feeling that shows a great promtl.se of continuity.

As Thomson and

Swanson observed, the U.S. is the main target:
Inevitably, nationalism adopts some
negative characteristics, and indeed,
it was one of the principal causes of
the two World Wars. It is usually
directed against the most easily per
ceived external force, and in the case
of Canada, that is clearly the United
States.6
The Canadian political system, like the American, functions by
and is legitimized in part by public opinion.

All elected officials

must keep constant vigilance on the direction of public opinion.

The

Canadian leadership, today is facing greater public demands for
distinct, policymaking reflecting a souvereign nation.

Again from

Thomson and Swanson:
. . .the vast majority of them still espouse
6

D.C. Thomson and R.F. Swanson, _op. cit., p. 18.
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the goal of the Fathers of Confedera
tion, a separate national entity on the
northern portion of the continent. And
a distinctive foreign policy is considered
generally an inherent part of that separate
national identity. 7
The Committee agitates for a more independent acting Canada, especially
vis-a-vis the United States.

It has proposed many solutions to

Canada's dependence upon the United States, which, if they have not
been taken seriously, have served to ignite a nationwide discussion
on those solutions to their number one problem, the overwhelming
presence of the U.S.
Canadians have shown themselves as willing to rally to nationa
list pleas especially when the United States has been a factor.

John

Diefenbacher and his Progressive Conservative Party won a landslide
victory in 195 7 ; partially attributable to the identification of the
opposition Liberal party with the Americans and Diefenbacher's charge
that if the Liberal government would be reelected, Canada would be
come America's virtual forty-ninth state in 195 7 .

Diefenbacher him

self assessed the Canadian nationalist mood in this way:
Canadians however are dete·r,mined to
strive for the preservation of their
distinctive characteristics and above
all for the right to determine Canada's
destiny in Canada and by Canadians.8
The parting of ways in policy content has been a frequent index
in recent years of Canadian nationalist fervor.
7 Op. Cit., p. 128.

8

John Diefenbacher, _op. cit., p. 3 7 .
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within NATO has come under criticism, according to some observers,
as a reflection of U.S. desires.

Peter C. Dobell notes one recent

policy which have galvanized Canadian national feeling:
The extent and persistence of public
pressure on the government to pursue
an active disarmament policy was
graphically demonstrated by the
remarkably public response to the U.S.
decision to explode a five migration
nuclear device at an underground
testing site on Amchitka in November
1971. This isolated Alaskan Island
is 1,500 miles from the closest point
on the West coast of Canada. Yet in
the weeks preceding the test, there
was a groundswell of protest by the
Canadian public from coast to coast.9
Dobell goes on to contend that the Amchitka explosion served
as a catalyst bringing many grievances into the open among Canadians.
This vigorous outburst by the Canadian
public to the Amchitka episode reflects
a variety of concerns: broad interest
in environmental questions, a growing
scepticism that the U.S. really needed
to improve on its already devastating
nuclear capacity, a carry-over of oppo
sition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam,
the persisting Canadian advocacy of
detente and disarmament, and more subtly
perhaps, a national reaction to apparent
American indifference to the effect of
Nixon's tariff barriers on Canada.lo
In another matter, the Trudeau government was compelled to take
action by a public outcry on the retaining of sovereignty over Canada's
Arctic shortly after a U.S. ship, the Manhattan, had journeyed through
9 Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles, (Toronto: Royal
Institute of International Affairs and Oxford University Press, 1972),p. 33.
l

O Op. Cit. , p. 35.
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those waters.

And after the restrictive legislation was introduced

in parliament, polls indicated Trudeau's party had captured the
public's support.
The recent expressions of national feeling in Canada provide
the government with convenient excuses in bilateral relations with
the U.S. but they also raise a difficulty.

It is difficult to sell

a policy to the public in which the interests of the United States
and Canada coincides.

Blanket anti-Americanism would have several

harmful effects, so the Canadian people must exercise good judgement
and perhaps, some restraint.

The challenge lies in maintaining a

healthy degree; not too much nor too little as John Holmes points
out:
There is a relationship between nationalism
and independence. One of the requisites for
Canada playing any distinctive role other
than that of satellites, is the maintenance
of a considerable degree of independence.11
Traditional Contacts with Europe
Great Britain has, for the greater part of Canadian history,
served as an effective counterweight to the U.S.

Britain's readiness

to protect the Canadian provinces up to the British North America Act
in 1867 and shortly thereafter probably helped to ensure Canada's
survival.

The traditional links with Europe, especially Great Britain,

11 John W. Holmes, The Better Part� Valour: Essays on
Canadian Diplomacy, (Toronto: McClellard and Stewart Ltd., 1970),
p. 38.
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have been emphasized in Canadian policy as a means of resisting
the array of influences and pressures emanating from south of the
border.
A newly independent Canada could have bargained for complete
independence from Britain and. . . "it would undoubtedly been accorded
to them but they saw in the imperial connection, a precious lifeline
to the mother country and a source of security against their dynamic
neighbor."

18

The foreign policy review of the Trudeau government took note
of this policy and announced a continuation:
Nevertheless Canada seeks to strengthen
its ties with Europe, not as an anti
American measure but to create a more
healthy balance within the North American
community and to reinforce Canadian in
dependence.19
Canada's traditional link with Europe takes on a more effective
character when all three areas are combined into a multilateral framework such as NATO.

Multilateralism involving a community of nations,

takes Canada out of the pressure of bilateral content of her relations
with the U.S.

R.J. Sutherland noted that this reasoning was paramount

in Canada's avid support of NATO:
The idea of an opening toward Europe
as an offset to excessive American
18

D.C. Thomson and R.F. Swonson, QE_. Cit., p. 21.

19
Honorable Mitchell Sharp and Department of External Affairs,
Foreign Policy for Canadian's Europe, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for
Canada, 1970), p. 1 4.
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influence was a powerful factor in
Canada's enthusiastic support for
NATQ,20
A former Canadian Defense Minister observed that with fifteen
people in bed, one is less likely to be raped.
At least two other results flow from Canada's participation
in multilateral settings.

As was suggested before, a combination

with other countries allows for Canada to resist the policies of the
U.S.

John Holmes provides several examples of the success of this

policy:
An examination of the Canadian record in
the United Nations, from the ending of the
Korean War to the present Canadian
opposition is the Geneva Disarament
Commission to the U.S.-Soviet proposals on
demilitarization of the diabed suggests that
combination with other countries is the
effective way of resisting American policies.21
Another effect of multilateral participation is influence on
U.S. policy. Many Canadian nationalists in recent times have come to
believe that Canada possesses an influence on policy-making in the
United States, even when Canadian interests come into play as in the
Cuban Missile Crisis.

Many Canadian statesmen have espoused the

policy of Quiet Diplomacy which involves a degree of behind the scenes
consultations between U.S. and Canadian diplomats.

The degree to

which this has been successful has come under critical scrutiny.
20 R
.J. Sutherland, "A Defense Strategist Examines the Realities",
in Canadian Foreign Policy since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?,
Edited by J.L. Granatstein, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pt.i°blishing Co., 1969),
p. 25.
21 John
Holmes, "Canada and United States: Political and Security
Issues", Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3, (1966), p. 412.
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particularly from the Canadian point of view.
Influence on U.S. policies takes on added weight when presented
within a multilateral context.

John Holmes points this contention

out:
Multilateralism is important in the
diplomacy of NATO where the combina
tion with lesser powers has been more
effective in affecting U.S. policy
than has Canadian influence alone.22
The traditional links updated by association through NATO, with
Europe, then enabled the young Canadian policy to survive its early
years and more recently they have served as counterweights to U.S.
pressure, allowing for Canada to resist U.S. policy and to influence
U.S. policy through the multilateral setting.

All of these effects

serve to increase Canada's independence vis-a-vis the United States.
The multilateral setting has turned Canadian attention elsewhere in
an attempt to introduce the same setting into its other international
contacts, particularly in Asia as the study will note later.
Defense
The Defense relationship was discussed earlier as a means that
serve to increase Canadian dependence upon the United States.

With

regard to the whole of the North American continent, this contention
remains supportable in the total sense.

That nation which threatens

the United States also threatens Canada.
When the cooperative extent of the North American Defense rela
tionship is examined, it becomes evident that there is another side
22 John Holmes,�- �t., p. 403.
--
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to the coin.
The North American Air Defense Agreement, for example, was
established to defend North America from Soviet intercontinental
bombers in the 1950's.

Today, the threat is composed of inter

continental ballistic missiles and nuclear powered submarines.

Today,

the prospect of anti-ballistic missiles and their limited deployment
within the U.S. contributes to the archaic nature of their Bomarc
system shared with Canada.

The North American defense effort also

included an anti-submarine warfare network.

The network was esta-

blished during the short-lived era of diesel submarines.

The new

Soviet nuclear subs are too sophisticated to be affected by the
obsolete system tracking of diesel powered subs.

David A. Baldwin

points out in regard to these obsolete agreements that ". . .as the
space age evolves and satellites multiply, the strategic significance
of Canada's geographic location will continue to shrink.1123
Thus, there remains the commitment of both nations to continental
defense, however, advancing technology has rendered some tracking and
weapons systems obsolete.

Thus, the infrastructure for continental

defense is in doubt and nationalist pressures in Canada against the
renewal and renovation of these agreements may give Canada cause for
a closer look at U.S. proposals.
This chapter has attempted to identify and evaluate those concepts
which have worked to increase Canada's independence of the United
23 David A. Baldwin, "Canadian-American Relations: Myth and
Reality", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2, (1971),
p. 130.

so
States.

The role of different histories and political systems

were discussed and the different policy approaches that were en
gendered were contrasted.

The role of the French-Canadian as an

obstacle to Canadian gravitation to U.S. was surveyed with some
doubt cast on the effectiveness of this role in continuity as Quebec
continues to develop.
Rising nationalism which manifested anti-American sentiment
was also discussed with its effects on the political climate being
mentioned.
The traditional links of Canada to Europe and the multilateral
setting were also identified as providing possibilities for a more
independent Canadian policy.
Finally, the defense relationships revealed a coin with two
sides, with one side emphasizing U.S.-Canadian cooperation which
increases Canada's dependence and the existence of outmoded
technological defense systems, from which Canada can extricate her
self to increase some independence.

CHAPTER IV
Countervailing Forces in Canadian Foreign Policy
Introduction
This chapter will attempt to relate the role of countervailing
forces to Canadian foreign policy.

There exists no scholarly or

official consensus as to the precise role that countervailing forces
play.
The concept of power balance comes into play in this considera
tion.

Actually, as W.W. Kulski has noted, "balance" is a poor

description, for power is not distributed equally.
a "distribution of power" characterization.1

Kulski prefers

If a regional distri

bution of power witnesses one nation accumulating the predominant
store of power, the other nations fall under the power projections
of the predominant force.
Hemisphere.

Such is clearly the case in the Western

Canada, Mexico, and the rest of the Western Hemis

pheric nations fall under the influence of the United States.

The

power projections of the United States clearly render the Western
Hemisphere as an American sphere of influence.

Although the

exceptions are numerous, the geopolitical realities of the Western
Hemisphere condition similarities in the policies of the member
1 W.W. Kulski, International Politics in� Revolutionary Age,
(New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1968), p. 43.
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nations.

Policies are similar enough among the nations of the

Western Hemisphere to support and legitimize the existence of the
Organization of American States.

Thus, a relationship between a

sphere of influence and an alliance exists in the Western Remisphere.

Ivo D. Duchacek noted the relationship:
Today, it seems that a sphere of influence
is usually coextensive with the alliance
system that one of the superpowers succeeded
in establishing or imposing on that area
and to which it has the overwhelming
capability of denying the opposite power
politic-military access.2

The obvious exception to the situation in the West is Cuba.
Cuba's economic and political survival depends on the willingness
of the Soviet Union to continue to support the Castro regime.
It is the dominant presence of the United States, however, that
is the cohesive force in the Western Hemisphere and the OAS.

The U.S.

has established its dominant position in the Western Hemisphere
through a variety of methods.

The U.S. has intervened in those nations

with military might when it has found its security or interests
threatened by a sudden change of government in this hemisphere or the
intrusion of a power not indigenous to the Western Hemisphere.
troops have intervened in Mexico frequently in earlier times.

U.S.
More

recently, Guatamala, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic have been the
objects of U.S. military intervention in varying forms.
Another way in which the U.S. has maintained its sphere of
influence has been the application of embargoes and economic barriers
2

Ivo D. Duchacek, Nations and Men, (New York:
and Winston Inc., 1971), p. 486.-- --

Holt, Rinehart,
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on a dissenting nation.

Cuba continues to be the object of a U.S.

led and OAS sponsored embargo.
A third way in which the U.S. maintains its influence is through
persuasion.

High level consultations are the grounds on which per

suasion may best be exercised.

K. J. Holsti buttresses this point:

Persuasion may include threats� rewards,
and actual punishments, but we mean here
situations in which a government simply
initiates or discusses a proposal with
another and elicits a favorable response
without explicitly holding out the
possibility of rewards or punishments.3
Persuasion seems best suited as a method in the U.S.-Canadian
relationship, due to the continuous high level consultations.

On

the other hand, the word, "punishment" is not adequate or even proper
to use within the context of Canadian-American relations.

The U.S.

and Canada are perhaps the best of allies, united in many cooperative
projects and ventures, but there are means within the U.S., due to
the extensive economic relationship, for inflicting serious economic
dislocations upon the Canadian people.

While the U.S. has never used

any of these means and very likely never will, they do exist and their
existence and Canadian vulnerability to them are precisely the con
cepts that Canadian nationalists find to be unnerving.
The crucial point in regard to U.S. and Canadian policy diver
gences lends itself to the fundamental differences of national interest.
3

K. J. Holsti, International Politics: !:._ Framework for Analysis,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1967), p. 204.
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It has been contended in an earlier chapter that the U.S. and
Canadian political systems have evolved differently, giving rise
to different policies in regard to the problems of the global
community.

Often, these policies differ only in the intensity of

feeling or in the means to the end.

The close nature of the

Canadian-American relationship is interrupted infrequently by the
clash of national interests.

For example, President Nixon's im

position of an import surcharge was primarily intended to ameliorate
American economic difficulties.
designed to punish Canada.

In no way was the import surcharge

And yet, as an earlier chapter demon

strates, Canada was hurt by the surcharge and faced the danger of
even greater economic problems.

The national interest of the United

States called for decisive economic action to remedy the continuing
problems of the American economy.

The national interest of Canada

dictates that there be free and continuing trade between the U.S.
and Canada.

The disruptive force was the import surcharge.

The ability of the U.S. to inflict such effects upon Canada
unnerves Canadian policy-makers and nationalists alike, despite the
fact that there is no basis, past or present, for contending that the
U.S. has or will ever punish Canada.

Therefore, it cannot be accurate

to contend that the U.S. has, does, or will punish Canada for policy
divergences.

The existence of means within the U.S. to produce

economic effects within Canada, good or bad, contribute to an image
of the threat of U.S. punishment of Canada for a radical policy
divergence.

Reluctance on the part of the U.S. to punish Canada de

tracts a great deal from this image, but the existence of means within
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the U.S. forms an image of the potential threat of the U.S. to
Canadian policy-makers and nationalists.
An examination of the uses of punishments or the threat of
punishments, used by the U.S. as a fourth means of maintaining
its sphere of influence, will provide further illumination of how
punishment is not an applicable term to Canada, but is a means used
for some other nations within the Western Hemisphere.

Holsti notes

the variety of ways the threat of punishment may be able to coerce
behavior:
Threats of punishment may be further sub
divided into two types: (a) positive
threats, where, for example, state A
threatens to increase tariffs, institute
a boycott or embargo against trade with
B or use force, (b) threats of deprivation
where A threatens to withdraw foreign aid
or in other ways withhold rewards or other
advantages that it already grants to B.4
Thus, the U.S. has employed a variety of strategies in the
attempt to maintain the sphere of influence.

On Cuba, for example,

both types of threats and ultimately actual physical pressure were
exercised.

Mexico has been subjected to invasion when her national

interest was at odds with that of the U.S.

In 1965, the national

interest of the U.S. could not accept a sudden change of government
in the Dominican Republic.

It was felt that the new government might

follow the course of Castro's Cuba and thus, represent another crack
in the Western Hemisphere as the U.S. sphere of influence.
U.S. security has been defined in terms of its ability to pre
vent penetration of the Western Hemisphere by an outside power.
4 Ibid.

This
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puts restraints, to an extent, on the contacts of nations of this
hemisphere with nations of the other hemisphere.

Although it would

be more accurate to portray this argument within a regional context,
the Western Hemisphere is the geographical sector that this analysis
has to examine.
If the nations within the U.S. sphere of •influence are re
stricted to the extent that they cannot pursue their own distinct
policies, they will attempt to find ways in which the influence and
pressure of the dominant nation can be offset.

In order for a nation

to adequately pursue its own distinct policy, even to the point of
being opposition to the U.S., that nation must increase its power
capacity vis-a-vis the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere's power distri
bution.

Frederick Hartmann lists four techniques used by states to

increase the power capacity.
balance of power system.

Hartmann's list refers to a bipolar

This analysis will apply the strategies to

the multilateral distribution of power system.

Hartmann's ideas

remain sound when examined in this context, however, the vocabulary
may need alteration.

Hartmann's list of strategies are as follows:

They are: (1) The acquisition of allies,
(2) The acquisition of territories, (3)
The erection of buffer states, (4) The
undermining of the potential (or actual)
enemy's strength.5
It is not accurate to use the word ally against the U.S.

In

more recent times, allies have come to mean a partner on a more
permanent basis, such as the Allies who stopped Hitler or the Allies
5 Frederick Hartmann, The Relations� Nations,
Macmillian Co., 1967), p. 320.

(New York:
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who have resisted the Soviet threat.

Nor is it proper for the

word "enemy" to be used in referring to the U.S. from a Canadian
viewpoint.

Perhaps even the most ardent Canadian nationalists

would balk at referring to the U.S. as an enemy.
an enemy of Canada, but a good friend.
"enemy" refers to a nemesis.

The U.S. is not

In Hartmann's context,

The U.S. might be more appropriately

labeled an obstacle to Canada.

The U.S. is an obstacle to Canadian

pursuance of a distinct foreign policy or independent national policy
because of the general restraints of the U.S. sphere of influence and
the more specific restraints of the Canadian-American relationship.
Every strategy listed by Hartmann cannot be employed by any
nation in order to increase its own power capacity and thus, pursue
its own independent policy.

The circumstances of the situation

render a given strategy effective or ineffective.

The acquisition

of territories is, for example, purely out of the question for Canada,
Mexico, and the rest of the Western Hemisphere in the event of
opposition to the U.S.
Canada is left with the first strategy, that of acquiring limited
alignments with other nations or matters, developments, and issues
where there is a coincidence of national interests and policies.

This

strategy works as one way of offsetting the influence and pressure of
the U.S.

The limited alignments are the counterweights Canada needs

and seeks to pursue her own distinct policy apart from the U.S.
Canada may seek to enlist the aid of other nations through multilateral
settings or to bring other nations directly to bear against the position
of the U.S.
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The attempts of Canada and other nations of the Western Hemisphere to employ offsetting strategies against the predominant
influence of the U.S.

This observation is based upon the notion

that the policies of the U.S. and the policies of the other nations
do not always coincide.
It seems that a general objective of a functioning political
unit is the pursuance of policy as dictated by the goals, aspirations,
mechanics of the government, and other realities of the given nation
state, without the interference of the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere.
Canada, on several occasions has had the U.S. interfere with
certain policies, but for the most part, the extensive relationship
with the U.S. subjects Canada to a great deal of influence.

In order

to minimize this influence, Canada has sought wider contacts with
other nations.
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, in calling for the government's
foreign policy review, admitted that some seventy percent of Canadian
foreign policy was made under the influence or in the shadow of the
U.S.

Trudeau believed that an objective of the foreign policy review

would be to find ways in which the independence of the remaining
thirty percent could be maximized.
The introduction of one factor to balance or resist another
factor is generally a deliberate policy formulation.
be what Trudeau seeks to expand.

This appears to

One such way, as Thomson and Swanson

point out, is the diversification of contacts:
First, he (Trudeau) was concerned like
a growing number of Canadians, by the
limitations imposed on the country's
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Canadians have clung to their ties with
Europe for a variety of reasons--as a
reaction against the rigours of the new
continent, from nostalgia for a tradi
tional way of life, for purposes of trade,
and as a counterweight to the natural
pressures of the United States. 8
Under Trudeau, the search for counterweights has reached new
areas.

In terms of policy-making, Canada has ·recently developed an

awareness of herself as a Pacific and Western Hemispheric nation.
The worldwide trends toward regional organization have opened Canada's
eyes to the Latin American nations and the possibilities they offer
as potential markets and more importantly, as counterweights to the
U.S.

If the U.S. serves as the predominant force in the Western

Hemisphere's distribution of power, then the nations under the spell
of U.S. power and pressure all have one thing in conunon.

The influence

of the U.S. is felt by all and all seek ways to minimize that influence.
The government's review of foreign policy made note of the trends
toward regional organization and Canada's task:
The trend toward regionalism, on the other
hand, poses problems for Canada because
its geographical region is dominated by the
United States; and because excessive regionalism
in other areas complicates Canada's effort to
establish effective counterweights to the
United States. Nevertheless, the government
sees no alternative to finding such counter
vailing influences and this will be reflected
in the new policy emphasis on geographical
diversification of Canada's interests-more attention to the Pacific and to Latin
America, for example---while taking fully
8 Thomson and Swanson,££.· cit., p. 10.
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into account new multilateral arrangements
in Europe.9
Thus, Canada's search for ways to maximize her freedom in
policy-making is to be greatly expanded.

The government's belief

in the success of counterweights is manifested by its desire to in
crease their usage.
The analysis will proceed then to those specific policy areas,
attempt to find the countervailing force, define its role, and
assess its usefulness to Canadian foreign policy.
Europe
Canada's ties with Europe have been ethnic, economic, and
political.

Today, her ties can be even stronger and the community

of interest between Canada and Europe expands into new areas.
foreign policy review points this out:
The maintenance of an adequate measure of
economic and political independence in the
face of American power and influence is a
problem Canada shares with the European
nations, and in dealing with this problem
there is at once an identity of interest
and an opportunity for fruitful cooperation.
Nevertheless Canada seeks to strengthen its
ties with Europe, not as an anti-American
measure but to create a more healthy balance
within the North Atlantic Community and to
reinforce Canadian independence.lO
9 The Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for
Canadians, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), p. 29.
lO Ibid, p. 14.
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The association with Great Britain has been far and away
Canada's strongest tie with Europe.

Maintenance of economic and

political ties with Britain has been a traditional premise of
Canadian foreign policy,

Since World War II, this relationship has

deteriorated due to several reasons.

The two most relevant are the

decline of Britain in the international community as a major economic,
political, and military power, and the corresponding rise of the
United States.

The decline in Britain's status has forced it to seek

admission to the highly successful European Economic Community.

Such

a development is bound to have disruptive implications for Canada.
Even before British intentions became known, the flow of British
Canadian trade had slowed.

Although the Canadian government has tried

to stimulate the sagging flow of trade, not much success has resulted.
Dobell illustrates one such attempt:
Although Diefenbacker came to power in 1957
with the declared intention of restoring
British trade to its prewar level of rela
tive importance. Britain's share of the
Canadian market actually fell during his
years in office.ll
John Diefenbacker was well known as a concerned Canadian nationalist, but his declared intention, whether more campaign rhetoric or
not, was never realized, as British trade did decline and trade with
the U.S. increased.

Although the initial British attempts to gain

access to the EEC were frustrated, the gravity of the situation compelled
the Canadians to seek alternative markets.
11

Peter C. Dobell, �- cit., p. 89.

Any retention of economic
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independence would have to be insured through the opening of
other European markets.

Ivan Head, Trudeau's top foreign policy

advisor, recognized the danger of the loss of British trade:
A reduction in the level of Canadian
exports to Britain, if of relatively
minor significance to the country's
total trade position would still
further erode the policy of maintaining
overseas markets as an offset to the
economic influence of the u.s.12
Thus, even if trade with Britain is unimportant economically,
Canadians would still wish to retain a portion to offset the growing
trade patterns with the U.S. Many people �n Canada have argued for
a new, more dynamic trade policy to allow for the decline of British
ties and to serve as a counterweight.

Such a proposal is now becoming

a reality due to Britain's entry into the EEC.
A new expanded trade policy with Europe as a means of offsetting
the preponderance of the U.S. in Canadian economic life raises the
question of the role of countervailing forces in economic policy.
The acquisition of limited alignments in trade and investment will
accomplish two objectives of Canadian policy.

One, a reduction of U.S.

control of Canadian industries is an objective the Canadians seek so
that they will not be so vulnerable to the U.S.

The second objective

is the reduction of U.S. influence in the Canadian political climate.
Limited alignments in Canadian economic life with other nations will
place Canadian vulnerability in a diversification of sources and will
dilute U.S. influence to some extent.

The same policy is applied to

Japan and will be treated later.

12 Ivan Head, "Canada, Britain, and the Common Market, " in The
World Today, Vol. 18, No. 2, (1962), p. 53.
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The citations from the Gray Report in an earlier chapter 13 of
this study have shown the types of strong ties spawned by an exten
sive economic relationship such as shared by the U.S. and Canada.
The Canadian policy seeks diversification and dilution in its economic
policy vis-a-vis the United States.

Diversification of Canada's

economic partners will accomplish dilution of U.S. influence, parti
cularly U.S. economic influence Canadian political life.

A wider

diversification of Canada's foreign investment sources could have
conceivably allowed Canada to escape the immediate restrictions on
her abilities to overcome extraterritorial application of U.S.
Trading law.
The idea of a dynamic trade policy became wedded to the idea of
trade expansion.

John Holmes points out that British desires to join

the EEC pushed the Canadians in these directions:
By the end of 1962, however, Canada was
adjusting itself to Britain's entry and
looking to the trade expansion program
as a means of establishing acceptable
relations with a united Europe.14
The trade expansion program has seen a rise in trade with Europe.
Table III shows only minimal increases of exports from West Germany
and France.

Italy doubled her exports in the four year period.

table shows a significant gain on the part of Japan.

The

Trade with the

Soviet Union dropped off because the Soviets refrained from buying

13

See Chapter II, pages 22,24.

14 John Holmes, "Canada in Search of Its Role," Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 4 1, No. 4, (196 3 ), p. 66 1.
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TABLE III
Exports by Leading Nations to Canada, 1964- 196815
(Thousands of Dollars)

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

United
States

4,271,059

4,840,456

6,027,722

7,079,396

8,891,998

Britain

1,199,779

1, 174,309

1,122,574

1,169,053

1,209,592

Japan

330,234

316,187

393,892

572, 156

606,787

West
Germany

211,360

189,493

176,800

177,955

228,870

China

136,263

105,131

184,879

91,306

163,243

Italy

62,236

92,223

114,787

141,439

131,210

Belgium
and
Luxembourg

100,535

128,Oll

117,5 05

100,800

127,380

U.S.S.R.

315,943

197,362

320,605

128,663

88,569

79,433

87,273

84,541

80,608

81,384

France

1 5 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada
Printer for Canada, 1969), p. 246.

1 970,

(Ottawa:

Queen's
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Canadian grain during the period reported.
Table IV shows about a forty percent increase in imports by
West Germany, France, and Italy.
showed significant increases.

The Netherlands and Japan both

The table indicates that Canadians,

during the four year period, were able to increase their sales
abroad, particularly in Europe, significantly.
Both tables show, at the same time, the continuing growth of
the U.S. in economic affairs pertaining to Canada.

U.S. growth

rivals the fastest growth by any other nation represented by the
table.

The significant increases on the part of Canada's trading

partners across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans bear testimony to the
Canadian effort to diversify and increase her contacts with other
nations, as a means of offsetting the prepoderance of the U.S.

However,

the rapid growth of the exports and imports of the U.S. to and from
Canada have simply nullified the gains expected by the Canadians in
the expansion of their economic ties to the European continent.
Despite this setback, the European continent continues to be
an area of promise to the Canadian plans to compensate for the decline
of the British role and to assure Canada of economic counterbalance
to the U.S.

Peter C. Dobell assesses the initiatives with some

optimism:
In objective terms, the countries of Western
Europe, including Britain, jointly represent
the one area of the world with which Canada
has a range and breadth of relationships which
could to some degree serve to offset the
weight of the United States. Apart from trading
relations which have already been detailed,
Europe has become in the last decade a sub
stantial source of equity investment and more
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TABLE IV
Imports by Leading Countries, 1964-1968
(Thousands of dollars)

1964

Countrz

1965

1966

16

196 7

1968

5,164,285

6,044,831

7,135,611

8,016,341

9,057,100

Britain

573,995

619,058

644,741

6 73,050

696,085

Japan

174,388

230,144

253,051

304,76 8

360,180

West
Germany

170,392

209,517

235,207

256,879

298,869

France

68,687

96,103

106,6 51

130,080

121,647

Italy

6 7,462

80,279

86,718

110,269

114,492

Netherlands

39,933

56,274

6 0,489

64,783

6 9,052

Belgium
and
Luxembourg

59,198

72,027

61,555

6 4,620

57,520

United
States

16

E.E_. Ci!-•P , 247
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recently, of medium-term financing, all
of which reduces Canadian dependency on
U.S. sources of finance.17
Canada must find ways in which her contacts with Europe can be
increased while holding the rate of growth on the part of the U.S.
at a steady level.

Whether or not the Canadian plans to achieve this

objective have been made is not clear, it is certain, however, that
U.S. gains which have nullified trade expansion effects with Europe,
have not dampened Canadian enthusiasm for greater contacts with
Europe.
Not only does Canada seek economic diversification from Europe,
but political contacts are expected to continue to increase to achieve
the political effect of offsetting the U.S.

The government's review

of foreign policy noted the following:
While there will be disadvantages and
problems of adjustment for Canada arising
out of the movement toward European inte
gration, there is also likely to be some
longer-term benefits, in particular
greater stability and prosperity in Europe
and a better balance within the Atlantic
world.
Both these results could be very
beneficial to Canada in its continuing
search for countervailing factors to offset
the pressure of its complex involvement with
the United States. 18
Apart from economics, Canada finds value in the European continent
as a political counterweight to U.S. influence.
17

Peter C. Dobell, ££.· cit., p. 96.

It has already been

18 The Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for
Canadians, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), p. 19.
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noted how Canada through a combination with other countries in a
multilateral arrangement can pursue a more independent approach,
particularly if it is an approach shared by the group in general.
Canada, through the same multilateral agreements, can find strength
in the numbers and thus is able to exercise a greater influence on the
direction of U.S. policy.
The concept of the Atlantic Community, framed within an arrange
ment of constant consultations and policy coordination, is very
attractive to Canada as a counterweight to the U.S. Canada's member
ship in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization appears to be well
suited for the attainment of Canadian objectives. NATO allows for some
Canadian participation in political decisions made by European defense
planners and the larger Atlantic Community.

Even though the Trudeau

government has reduced and withdrawn a portion of the Canadian conunit
ment to NATO, Canada retains a political conunitment to the organization
and has proposed an expansion of NATO to include social and cultural
contacts.

Canada also wishes to see NATO updated to meet the different

challenge of the 1970's.
Canada believes NATO serves two important objectives of Canadian
foreign policy.

One, it serves as a counterweight to U.S. political

influence through the benefits of multilateralism and policy coordina
tion.

Two, NATO has recently become more of a diplomatic rather than

a military alliance and Canada sees the transformation as useful toward
easing East-West tensions through mutual force reductions and similar
initiatives.

Commenting on a statement by Mitchell Sharp who proclaimed
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multilateralism as the basic principle of Canadian foreign policy,
Thomson and Swanson point out:
Clearly the attempt to diversify
Canadian contacts abroad and to
unfreeze the Cold War were part of
the same strategy.19
In regard to the attempt to diversify Canadian contacts abroad,
the same two Canadian Studies scholars note:
• . .the Canadians were increasingly
engaged in a quest for countervailing
forces to American influence, and Europe,
particularly a united Europe, appeared to
offer the greatest hope in that regard.
In that sense, the tide of pro-European
thinking was running stronger again.20
The promotion of detente in Europe assures Canada that the
roles of seeking detente and diversification of contacts are sym
biotic objectives.

This continues to warrant Canada's participation

in NATO, as the government's review of foreign policy points out:
One of the compelling reasons for Canada
to remain a member of NATO is the important
political role that NATO is playing and that
Canada is playing within NATO in reducing
and removing the underlying causes of potential
conflict by negotiation, reconciliation, and
settlement.21
A relaxation in East-West tensions will undoubtedly condition a more
flexible approach to U.S. foreign policy, thus lessening the number of
possible conflicts and restraints on Canada engendered by U.S. foreign
19
20

21

Thomson and Swanson,.££.· cit., p. 71.

OR, Cit� ,p. 34.

The Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians:
Europe, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), p. 24.
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policy. The seeking of detente involves the promotion of poly
centrism in the Eastern as well as the Western bloc. As such, in
creased contacts hold the promise or at least the possibility of
increased counterweights to the U.S. Thus, Canadian enthusiasm
for detente is primarily justified by the diversification of contacts.
In the East, the

Soviet Union has become a prime factor in Canada's

search for countervailing forces. Both the

Soviet Union and Canada

are bordered on their north by the mineral rich Arctic seas and islands.
The Canadians were awakened to their northern borders by a campaign
pledge by John Diefenbacker and by the emplacement of defense installations in that area. Thomson and

Swanson note a third reason:

...
the attention of Canadian policy
planners has been turned toward the
Arctic Basin as a source of strength
to reduce the asymmetr between Canada
22
and the United States.
The following incident clearly indicates the attempt of Canada
to strengthen her position within the U.S.dominated distribution of
power setting in the Western Hemisphere through the attempted acquisition of an ally.
Within the U.S.sphere of influence, Canada is relatively
powerless, especially vis-a-vis the United

States. Thus, when Canada

and the U.S.disagreed over the use of the Arctic waters, Canada was
thrust into a bilateral setting with the dominant power, the U.S.
Canada attempted to balance the dominance of the U.S. by involving
the

Soviet Union.
22 Th
omson and

w
S anson, op.cit., p. 11.
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The U.S. steamship-tanker Manhatten navigated its way through icy
Arctic seas in 1969 in search of a feasible route for the transpor
tation of Alaskan oil to the continental United States.

When the

Manhatten made its journey, it did so in waters that the Canadian
people assumed to be their own.

The Trudeau government was alarmed

at the voyage and immediately introduced legislation to restrict the
passage of vessels in the waters north of Canada's land mass.

On

April 22, 1970, the House of Commons unanimously passed legislation,
which authorized the establishment of exclusive Canadian fisheries
in certain areas beyond the normal twelve miles, and establishing
shipping safety control zones, extending one hundred miles from shore.

23

The Arctic Waters Pollution Bill, enacted in August of 1970, in effect,
subjected the Northwest Passage to Canadian control for the purpose
of pollution control.
Such legislation put Canada and the United States on opposite
sides of the debate over the use of territorial and international waters.
The Canadian position supported territorial interests while the United
States supported the maritime bloc.

Territorial nations claim a

distance of the seas, which they believe to be necessary to their
interests.

The maritime nations believe in the use of international

uniform standards and regulations to apply to all nations.
When the legislation was passed, Canada received a protest from
the U.S., claiming that Canada had no right to control pollution in
Arctic waters outside the territorial limits.
23 Thomason and Swanson, op. cit., p. 70.

Canada rejected the
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protest and sought the assistance of other nations in supporting
the Canadian action.

The Canadian government turned to multilateral

action as a way of standing fast against the U.S.

The closest

possible ally for the Canadian side was another nation which had
laid extensive claims to the Arctic area and like Canada, had a long
Arctic border.

That nation was the Soviet Union.

I n regard to this

policy disagreement, many Canadians were inclined to regard the Soviets
as allies and the U.S. as an enemy.
The Soviets have had vast experience in the Arctic area.
Reschetar reports

24

that when the Soviets seized power, territorial

waters were one of their first concerns.
fined the control of the Arctic.
Soviets on May
waters.
well.

25

2 4,

John

Two successive decrees de-

The first decree was issued by the

19 2 1, and claimed the twelve mile limit on all

The Soviets exercised control in the airspace above as

Reschetar asserts that, "in practice, the Soviet Union has

2
extended territorial waters well beyond the twelve mile limit.11 6

On April 15, 19 2 6, the Soviets again issued a decree specifying
territorial waters to include all islands in the Arctic sector.

The

decree specifies the claim as not including the Arctic Sea, but
laying claim to the Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, and Chukchi Seas.
24

27

John S. Reschetar, The Soviet Policy, (New York: Dodd, Mead, and
Co. Inc., 1971) p. 306.
25
26

27

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Since the Soviet regime had experiences similar intrusions
into their Arctic, the Canadian government believed that the Soviets
would be interested in a solution to the problem.
In 1963, for example, the United States Coast Guard icebreaker,
Northwind, carried out an oceanographic survey itinerary which in
cluded journeys into the Bering Sea to Cape Cheliuskin and the Vil'
kitskii Straits.

In 1965, the Northwind carried out similar activities

in the Kara Sea.

On both occasions the Northwind was kept under con-

stant surveillance, but was not harassed by the Soviets.

In 1967,

two U.S. icebreakers were prevented from passage through the Vil'kitskii
.
28
S traits.

In response to an official U.S. protest, the Soviet foreign

ministry declared that the straits were within territorial waters and
passage through would be a violation of Soviet territorial waters.
With this type of experience in common, the Canadians thought that the
Soviets would be prime candidates to turn bilateral negotiations into
a multilateral setting in which Canada could articulate her view behind
the protection of numbers and common sentiments.
The Soviets were, however, reluctant to get involved.

Several

possible explanations exist to explain the Soviet reluctance.

One,

their own claims in the Arctic area are vast and the Russians evidently
feared the possibility of these claims coming under critical inter
national scrutiny.

Thomson and Swanson supported this contention by

noting:
. . . .the Soviet authorites were not
anxious to get involved in the United
States-Canada quarrel since it might
28

Ibid.
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bring into question heir own position
in the Arctic Basin. 29
Secondly, the Soviets might unhappily witness the restriction
of the activities of her trawler fleet due to an adoption of new
international maritime standards.

Three, the Soviets, like the

Americans, draw the line at getting involved in a dispute in what
one may regard as the other's sphere of influence.
Thus, the Canadians have acted largely on their own.

One and

a half years later, on his visit to the U.S.S.R., Trudeau again asked
for help, but the Soviets preferred to remain aloof.

Though the

attempt of the Canadian government to establish the Soviets as a
countervailing force as a means to attain sovereignty in the Arctic
was unsuccessful, remarks by Trudeau, during his visit to the U.S.S.R.,
indicated that the Canadian government was not going to abandon contact
with the Soviet regime.

Trudeau gave a clear perspective to the

search for counterweights when he noted:
Everyone knows that Canadians feel
rather dominated by the American pre
sence, not only economically, but also
culturally, socially, etc. and it is
30
important for us to have other contacts.
Trudeau's search for other contacts stretches beyond Western
Europe and has opened up the possibility of contact on a greater
scale with Eastern Europe.

Several trade agreements have already been

carried out with East Europe.

In addition, to diversifying contacts,

29 Thomson and Swanson, Op. Cit., p. 70.

3o Quoted by Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy,
(Toronto: Oxford Un. Press, 1972), p. 77.
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the trade arrangements with Eastern Europe have been beneficial to
the Canadian economy.

Trade with the Soviets and East Europe has

brought a new vitality to the grain producing western provinces.
Charles Hanley notes as well:
These sales have also brought about a
substantial reduction in our balance
of payments problem.31
The economic realm is complemented by a political contact as
well.

As noted earlier, Canadians are seeking to make use of NATO as

a diplomatic instrument to help bring about a lessening of tensions
in Europe.

Consultations with the Warsaw Pact nations are intricate

to the attaining of this objective.

If a lessening of tensions is

to be achieved, there will be a new flexibility in U.S. foreign policy,
which will allow the Canadians greater freedom.

Greater contact with

Eastern Europe will also help the government to realize its objective
of maintaining an European counterweight to the U.S.
This study has shown the decline of Britain as Canada's principal
counterweight to the U.S.

A decline in the contact with Britain was

made even more likely by the British decision to gain entry to the
European Economic Community.

Canadians have responded with a larger

more dynamic trade policy with more European nations which Canada
hopes will compensate for the loss of close ties with Britain.

The

use of the European Community as a counterweight clearly assumes the
form of the means to protect and reinforce Canadian sovereignty by
31 Charles Hanley, "The Ethics of Independence,'' in An Independent
Foreign Policy for Canada? Edited by Stephen Clarkson (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart Ltd. 1968), p. 21.
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preventing gravitation to the American orbit.
The territorial waters dispute was examined involving the
United States and Canada.

An attempt to enlist the aid of the

Soviets was made by the Canadian government, to counter-balance the
pressure of the U.S., but the Soviets preferred to remain aloof from
the conflict.
Latin America
Traditionally, Canada has been so Europe-oriented that she has
devoted little contact to other areas of the world, particularly
Latin America.

As the conflict between the East and the West is be-

coming replaced by the conflict between haves and have not nations ,
Latin America is clearly growing in its importance to the Western
Hemisphere.

Citing the conflict between the rich and poor nations,

Trudeau sent the largest ministerial mission to Latin America in 1969
of any previous Canadian administration.
The possibility for cooperation between Canada and Latin America
is strong as the government's review of foreign policy noted:
. . .there are expanding possibilities
for mutual benefits, especially in terms
of economic growth, enhancement of the
quality of life, and the promotion of
social justice between different parts of
the hemisphere.32
Most central to Canada's interest in Latin America is the debate
over whether or not Canada should take on full membership in the
32 The Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians:
Latin America, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), p. 30.
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Organization of American States.

The pressure has been on Canada

from many Western Hemisphere nations to give serious consideration
to membership.

The government has seemed satisfied, however, with

the role of an observer within the OAS circles. Many factors are
now entering the debate although the government refuses to take the
big step.

Two scholars who argue for Canada to join

the OAS condemn

the present policy:
These ostrich-like attitudes and
policies make no sense in a world
increasingly shrunken by advances
in transportation and connnunication.
Latin America is not far beyond our
doorstep and we cannot afford to
close our eyes to the undercurrent of
33
crisis simmering just below the surface.
Condemnations have come from the U.S. and some Latin American
nations as well.

Trudeau has remained steadfast, advancing several

arguments against joining the organization.

One, he believes that

membership will restrict Canada's freedom in development assistance
matters.

Through the OAS, developmental assistance is designed by

the Inter-American Development bank. The bank pre-empts the govern
ment's freedom to assist any nation it may wish.
regulates amounts of assistance as well.

The bank also

Trudeau sees the Canadians

as inhibited by this provision of the OAS.

Secondly, Trudeau has

noted with distaste the low priority assigned by the OAS to cultural
exchange progrannnes with Latin American nations.
33

Thirdly, and

Irving and Richard Brecher, "Canada and Latin America", Queens
Quarterly, Vol. LXXIV, No. 3, (1967), p. 465.
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perhaps the provision the Canadians would find most restictive
is the application of sanctions and embargoes on a country such as
Cuba.

The foreign policy review reiterates Trudeau's contention:
.the potential obligation to
apply political and economic sanctions
against another country by virtue of
an affirmative vote of two-thirds of
the members is a difficult feature of
the OAS from the Canadian point of view.
This could limit the Canadian govern
ment's freedom of action with regard to
a future security crisis in the hemis
phere.34

It is questionable how much restriction or restraint would be placed
on the Canadian government's freedom of action if it did joint the
OAS.

The OAS boycott was successfully resisted by Mexico, even though

Mexico was a full member of the OAS.

John Holmes notes the danger for

Canada when placed in a similar situation:
Canada would certainly have backed Mexico
in opposing the OAS boycott. It is hard
to see, therefore, how Canada could even
if it were so disposed, join the OAS until
there has been some change in its relations
with Cuba. If Canada were to join, it
would presumably be obliged to accept rules
laid down previously by the club. But if
Canada's first act after joining the OAS
were a rupture of relations with Cuba, it
would confirm the view of those who have
always argued that joining the OAS would
commit Canada to docile submission to U.S.
policy.35
Holmes notes that the independence theme was paramount in the mind of
Trudeau, when considering the membership in the OAS:
During the Liberal Party's leadership
34 Department of External Affairs,�· cit. p. 21.
3S John Holmes, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian
Diplomacy, (Toronto:McClelland andStewart Ltd. 1970), p. 234.
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campaign. Mr. Trudeau pointed out
that Canada should enter the OAS,
but only when it developed a policy
toward Latin America which would permit
Canada to make decisions independentl
�
from those made by the United States. 6
Thus, there is that desire to keep an arm's length from the U.S.
in policy-making.

To join the OAS would put Canada directly in between

the U.S. and many OAS nations further south.

Canada, in many situa

tions, would inevitably face the doubtful distinction of being tagged
a Yank Stooge when she sided with the U.S. and she would, in the case
of a split, receive her share of trouble from the U.S. when she sided
with other American countries.

The Canadians see the OAS as dominated

by the U.S. and they see their entrance into the organization as move
ment into an area of U.S. influence.

An entrance into the OAS would

seem to work against Canadian purposes of establishing counterweights.
The multilateralism that Canada found attractive in NATO does not exist
in the same way in the OAS.

By remaining outside the OAS, Canada

remains outside an area of great U.S. influence.

Thus, Canada retains

a great deal of freedom with regard to her policies toward Latin
America.

This freedom to act removes formal reasons for the U.S. to

take offense at divergent Canadian policy.

In the case of Cuba, the

OAS followed a policy distinct from that chosen by Canada.

Had Canada

been a member of the organization, the pressures on her would have been
different.
36 J.C.M. Ogelsby, "Canada and the Pan American Union: Twenty One
Years On" in International Journal , Vol. XXIV, No. 3, (1969), p. 587.
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Canada's request to remain a permanent observer seems compatible
with her desire to use her freedom of action toward Latin America by
refusing membership and therefore, remaining outside an area of U.S.
influence.
Canada's desire to strengthen her relations with Latin America
rests in part on the possibility of having a Latin American counter
weight to the U.S.

Thomson and Swanson point out the source of unity:

The factor that draws Canadians and Latin
Americans closest together is the same
one that separates them in other respects,
the presence of the U.S. All are under
her influence to some degree and uncomforable
in that situation.37
The desire to get involved in hemisphere business has stirred the
Canadian leadership to embrace membership in the Pan-American Health
Organization, the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences,
the Inter-American Indian Institute, the Inter-American Conference on
Social Security and the Inter-American Export Center.
are non-political in nature.

All of these

The political involvement of Canada in

Latin America has yet to be realized.

But she seems certain to stay

outside the OAS and any other hemispheric organizations which feel U.S.
pressure.
The case of Cuba gives vivid illustration and support to Canadian
policy.

Fidel Castro had by 1959 effectively replaced the Batista

regime.

Castro in the early days of power had promised that there would

be no confiscation of property by his government.
37 Thomson and Swanson,�- cit.,

p. 100.

But other developments
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were occurring which the U.S. found unsettling.

In May of 1959,

it was announced that the Soviets would contribute aid to the
Castro regime, bringing on a rush of speculation about the ideological orientation of the Castro regime.

In July of 1959, the

chief of the Cuban Air Force fled to the U.S., charging that the new
regime was Communist.

This led to the question of imposing sanctions

and embargoes on the Cuban regime.

Then, in September, stretching

into October, Castro issued a series of decrees which nationalized all
banks in Cuba with the exception of two Canadian banks.

The two

banks eventually were to withdraw due to operating difficulties.

Other

expropriation measures were taken, but no Canadian assets were seized.
It is not clear why Castro chose to leave them alone, but Canada did
maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba and this may be a factor.
Nonetheless, Canadian interests in Cuba did escape nationalization
and as Edward McWhinney noted, Canadian interests were large:
Canadian owned assets were exempt from the
application of the Castro expropriation
measures. While no definitive survey has
been made of the character and extent of such
Canadian assets in Cuba, it is known that
Canadian interests in insurance and banking
were very large.38
For the U.S., the nationalization of the banks was the last straw.
Immediate steps were taken by the U.S. to impose a trade embargo on Cuba.
Robert Reford states the Canadian reaction:
What Washington did, of course, was its
38 Edward McWhinney, "Canadian-United States Relations and
International Law," from Canada-United States Treaty Relations,
Edited by David R. Deener, (Durham: Duke Un. Press, 1963), p. 115.
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own business, but Ottawa had no
intention of following suit.
Objections to an embargo were based
on two grounds: the practical
commercial one that Canada is a
trading nation, looking for markets
everywhere including the Communist
countries, and the theoretical one
that this was the wrong way of pro
tecting your interests and would not
achieve its alms.39
Thus, Canada set herself on a collision course with the U.S.
Diplomatic pressure was exerted on Canada to follow the U.S. line.
The most important reason for the U.S. pressuring Canada was noted
by Denis Stairs:
For a number of reasons, the pressure
on Canada was particularly intense.
Perhaps the most important was the
similarity between the Canadian and
American economics for no other country
could replace so effectively the United
States as Cuba'a chief supplier of
manufactured goods.40
Other sources report of continuing U.S. diplomatic pressure.
The Toronto Globe and Mail reported:
For observers who are not privy to the
documents of the Department of External
Affairs, it is diffiuclt to determine
how severe the American pressure actually
was. There can be no doubt, however,
that it was considerable.41
39 Denis Stairs, "Confronting Uncle Sam: Cuba and Korea,"
An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Edited by Stephan Clarkson,
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1968), p. 59.
40 ibid.

41 The Toronto Globe and Mail statements, (December 13, 1960),
are quoted by Denis Stair��-cit., p. 60.
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Despite this, the Canadians stood fast to their trade and
their diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Even the OAS clamoring for

compliance did not dissuade the Canadians.

They did, however, take

great solace in the fact that Mexico, an OAS nation, also chose to
maintain normal diplomatic relations with Castro. Mexico may well
have been the key nation in Canada's refusal to· follow the U.S.
policy line.

Mexico was subjected to organizational pressure from

the OAS and American pressure as well.
Like Canada, Mexico shares a long border with the U.S.

Both

nations maintained normal diplomatic activity with Castro in the face
of U.S. diplomatic pressure.

Reprisals from the U.S. on either

dissenting nation would have brought a great deal of international and
hemispheric criticism of the U.S. at a time when the U.S. sought to
attract support.

A second factor aided Canada and Mexico.

That was the

exercise of restraint on the part of the U.S. which confined its
pressure to high level consultations.

A third factor may well figure

in and that is that Canada simply chose to ignore the embargo as a test
of her independence.

As was noted earlier, the Canadian people do

not subscribe to trade sanctions and embargoes which tend to exacerbate
the situation.
the line.

Thus, they may well have put the national policy on

Whatever the reasons, the Canadians, like the Mexicans, con

tinued their exchange with Castro.
The discovery of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba in October of
1962 added to the Canadian-American disagreement over Cuba.

When U.S.

armed forces were placed on alert and the quarentine of Cuba imposed,
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specific provisions of the NORAD and other continental defense
schemes warranted that Canada put her forces on alert as well.
Canada instead waited.

The provisions had also stated that continental

military action would be undertaken as a result of consultations be
tween those nations involved, particularly the U.S. and Canada.

The

U.S. acted unilaterally, without living up to the accords of the
agreements and this probably contributed to the Canadian decision to
stall.

Robert Reford added two other reasons:
He (Diefenbacker) based his opposition
on two grounds. First, he did not like
the idea of automatically acceding to an
American request, wishing Canadian policy
to be independent and decided in Ottawa.
Secondly, he regarded the situation as
serious and he did not want to take any
action that might aggrevate matters.42

As the situation worsened, Diefenbacker halted the Soviet civilian
overflights in Canadian airspace as allowed by the International Civil
Aviation Organization.
troops on alert.

As before, though, Diefenbacker refused to put

The rest of Canada was rapidly changing its mind

as Reford cites:
Some still thought Canada had been
treated shabbily by the President, but
they felt it was time to swallow one's
pride. With the world apparently poised
on the brink of war, there was no
alternative to endorsing U.S. action.
But Diefenbacker refused to budge.43
On October 24, Diefenbacker placed the Canadian armed forces on
alert.

This was an admission that the crisis had reached such pro

portions that Canada could no longer afford to stay out.
42 Robert Reford, �- cit., p. 180.
43 Robert Reford, �- cit., p. 184.
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Khrushchev agreed to remove the weapons and the quarentine was re
laxed, the Canadians government resumed its trade and diplomatic re
lations with Cuba.
Peter C. Dobell assessed the crisis and continuing relations
with Cuba and observed:
During the 1960's Canada's continued
diplomatic relations assumed a signi
ficant symbolic importance as a demon
stration of Canadian independence from
American influence in foreign policy.
Canada has maintained fairly healthy
trade relations with Cuba as well al
though initially Canadian sales were
limited to food and drugs in order not
to give too much offense to the u.s. 44
Thus, Canada's decision to continue her relations with Cuba
lent considerable credence to her sovereignty in foreign policy.
Restraint by the U.S. in dealing with its dissenting allies must be
considered within this analysis.

Ivan Head supports this same con-

tention:
Freedom to pursue our own interests
without undue interference proves
the sincerity of U.S. foreign policy,
not so much to Canadians who are in
doubt only occasionally but to other
countries which may be in the habit of
calling that good faith into question.45
In regard to Latin American, Canada seeks to expand her contact
and communication with those nations of the American hemisphere.
44 Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles, (Oxford: Royal
Institute of International Affairs and Oxford Un. Press, 1972), p. 119.

45
Ivan Head, "Foreign Policy of the New Canada", Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 50, January, 1972, p. 242.
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Canada's refusal to remain outside the OAS stems from her view
of the American-dominated organization.

By remaining outside the

organization, Canada preserved a greater share of freedom in her
policy toward Latin America.

Canada's role in the Cuban Crisis

was examined to determine the interplay of various factors.

u;s.

role of a countervailing force was minimal.

The

restraint, Mexico's

continued acceptance of the Castro regime, and Canadian resolve to
stand firm all indicate the pursuit of an independent foreign policy
where counterweights were not that available.
Asia
The Far East represents an area of new possibilities for Canada.
Although Canada has always had a Pacific coast, she has traditionally
taken very little interest in the Pacific.

Prime Minister Trudeau's

search for countervailing forces has compelled him to grant greater
consideration to the Pacific area.

John Holmes sees the area as one

that has the promise of helping Canada in her search for counter
weights:
Regardless of the facts, whatever they
are, Canadians have been looking hopefully
at the wide world for counterbalance. The
gesture toward the Pacific should be seen
in this context. The countries on the far
side of the Pacific are a fascinating area
and their vast population and rapid develop
ment give promise of counterbalance of pro
portions adequate to relax Canadian dependence
on its one great market and source of in
vestment, the U.S. 46
46 John Holmes, "Canada and the Pacific,", Pacific Affairs,
Vol. XLIV, No. 1, (1971), p. 16.
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The continuing search for counterweights and the development
of the Western provinces have both contributed immensely to Canada's
new energies in the direction of the Pacific. Canada's fastest
growing port in Vancouver, through which 48 of the 54 principal
western commodities passed on their way to Japan.

Economic and

commercial opportunities abound for Canadian interests in the Pacific.
The rapidly developing relationship with Japan is only one such
example as Holmes notes:
It (Japan) has already assumed third
place to the U.S. and Britain in
Canadian trade and may well rise to
second place soon.47
Growing Japanese investment in Canada and Japanese trade with Canada
has been growing at a rate that seems to challenge the predominance
of the U.S.

Lorne Kavic has the statistics to bear this contention out:
The complementary nature of the Canadian
and Japanese economics will continue to
facilitate two way trade, which could total
$2,336 million by 1973 and $3,500 million
by 1957. According to these estimates,
Canadian exports will rise to $1,532 million
by 1973 and $2,200 million by 1975 and imports
from Japan will increase to $804 million and
$1,300 million respectively.48

The rate of investment has in fact alarmed many Canadians, but
they do take solace in the knowledge that foreign investment within
Canada is being diversified.

As a result, Japan's economic ties with

Canada are rapidly assuming the proportions needed to offset the
pressure and influence of the United States.
47 0
_E_·
48

't
�-,
p.
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Lorne Kavic, "Canada-Japan Relations", International Journal,
Vol. XXVI, No. 3, (1971), p. 569

88
The economic attractions and the search for counterweights are
then the primary reasons for the new Canadian interest in the Pacific.
The potential for diversification of contacts is great in Asia.

Canada

must cope however with her relationship with the U.S. as she seeks
further penetration of the Asian sector.

A radical divergence in policy

on the part of Canada is not at all impossible as the foreign policy
review observed:
However, much Canada has in common with
the U.S., the Canadian outlook is often
fundamentally different, reflecting a
different historical evolution, different
capacities in the international power
spectrum, and different interests.49
Policy divergences between the U.S. and Canada have been made
manifest in the attitude toward China more than anywhere else in Asia.
At the outbreak of the Korean War, Canada contributed troops to the
U.N. police force bound for Korea.

After the successful landing at

Inchon and the subsequent route of the North Korean forces, General
Douglas MacArthur began to advocate an air, sea, and possible land
attack on the People's Republic of China.

The Chinese had aided the

North Korean attack to an extent and now that the North Koreans were
being defeated, the Chinese had threatened to enter the conflict.
MacArthur evidently wanted to deal with the Chinese before they became
a problem.

The Canadian point of view was in disagreement.

Lester

Pearson, the then Secretary of State for External Affairs noted:
We had reason to believe that a defensive
line could be established across the narrow
waist of North Korea and that the two
49 The Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians:
Asia, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), p. 12.
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northern provinces of Korea would be
left, for the time being, at least,
as a kind of unoccupied frontier
area. That scheme seemed sensible to
us and we hoped it could be carried
out.50
In regard to the bombing and blockading of the Chinese main
land, Pearson was also very cautious, always seeming to favor leaving
the door open for negotiations.

On January 11, 1951, the U.S. was

pressing the United Nations for a resolution condemning China as an
aggressor.

Canada had seen a promising sign and opposed the resolu

tion initially.

Pearson pointed out that the Canadian point of view

was opposed to the formal condemnation of China:
We were all loath at that moment to
support a formal condemnation of China
in the U.N. because we felt that the
clarification which had come from Peking
afforded some possibility of satisfactory
negotiation with that regime.51
The entry of China into the war laid the basis for another
disagreement between the U.S. and Canada.

Earlier, on December 6, 1950,

after Chinese troops had been positively identified as taking part in
the combat, the U.S. imposed a trade embargo on the Chinese mainland.
Three days later, the Canadian government reluctantly followed suit.
After the Korean ceasefire was signed, the Canadians wished to relax
this embargo, but the U.S. was not so inclined.

Several Canadian trade

deals with Cina in those early days were thwarted.

Robert Reford

reports of a shipment of canned shrimps and soya sauce was prevented

SQ Lester Pearson, "On Crossing the 38th Parallel in Korea",
Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-54, Edited by Robert Mackay (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart Ltd, 1970), p. 306.
51 Lester Pearson, op. cit., p. 307.
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from entering Vancouver via the state of Washington.52

Only some

loud complaining by the Canadian authorities eventually gained
passage for the shipment.

The incident serves to show how inflexible

U.S. policy had become and how Canada was restrained by that policy.
The establishing of diplomatic relations with the Peking regime
has received the attention of scholars and government officials alike
in the annals of Canadian foreign policy.

From the time of the

seizure of power by Mao Tse-tung until the recognition of the regime
in October of 1970, the issue had been a sore spot with Canadian
nationalists.

Four Canadian Prime Ministers grappled with this problem.

After the Communist takeover of the mainland, consideration of the
question of recognition was steeped in a high degree of North American
anti-communist hysteria, which was manifested in extremes in Canada
as well as the U.S.

The outbreak of the Korean War and the subsequent

Chinese intervention laid the issue aside.
Earlier, though, in 1949, several respectable nations had accorded
recognition to the new regime.

Canada had been among those giving

serious consideration to the idea.

Lester Pearson explained the

Canadian position:
We have been asked to recognize the new
Communist government in Peking which
does in fact control a large part of the
country. Recognition, of course, does
not imply or signify moral approval, it
is simply an acknowledgement of a state
of affairs that exists.53
52 Robert Reford, op. c�.
. t , p. 55.
53

Lester Pearson, "The Communist Takeover of China", In Canadian
Foreign Policy 1945-54, Edited by Robert Mackay (Toronto: McClelland
and Stewart Ltd., 1970), p. 338.
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John Diefenbacker was known to favor recognition of the Peking
government, but his mention of merely admitting China to the U.S.
caused President Eisenhower to say the U.S. would withdraw from the
U.S. should Peking gain admission.

Despite the hard line American

attitude, Diefenbacker edged the Canadian government closer to the
establishment of relations through a series of.wheat deals, arranged
almost exclusively in Canada, away from U.S. interference.
When he became the Prime Minister, Lester Pearson was inclined
toward recognition, but the U.S. remained steadfastly opposed to the
move.

As U.S. involvement in Vietnam grew, so did its opposition

to the recognition of China.

Peter C. Dobell sees this contention

as supportable:
In principle, he (Pearson) favored
recognition but events conspired
against him without the U.S. having
to make any overt move. Negotiations
with the People's Republic over
recognition while the U.S. was becoming
increasingly embroiled in Vietnam would
have been regarded by the Americans as
an unfriendly act.54
John Holmes noted that the U.S. government was adament on this issue
and "has never failed to express its anxiety that Canada should not
step out of line.1155
Public opinion in Canada was opposed to U.S. involvement in
5 4 Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles, (Oxford:
The Royal Institute of International Affairs and Oxford Un. Press,
1972), p. 10 4.
55

John Holmes, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian
Diplomacy, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1970), p. 215.
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Vietnam and John Holmes points out the effect it had on the China
question:
Demands for recognition of China which
many Canadians believed was being pre
vented solely by American pressure were
increasing as public displeasure with
American policy in Vietnam increased.56
As U.S. involvement in Vietnam began to t"aper off, the in
flexible policy of the U.S. toward China began to change.

The changing

of Canadian administrations and the demands on the part of Canadian
nationalists for recognition as a demonstration of independence in
foreign policy added new impetus to the movement toward establishing
diplomatic relations.

It was still no easy task for the government

because the reaction of the U.S. still loomed important and no real
satisfactory formula for the status of Taiwan had been worked out.
Holmes wrote of the former problem, the U.S. reaction:
Direct pressure from Washington was not
so much a factor as Canadian uneasiness
about provoking the wrath of the U.S.
Congress. 57
Although the Nixon administration had gone on record as opposing
the recognition of China, there was no interference with the Canadians
as they began earnest negotiations with the Chinese representatives.
Recognition was announced in October of 1970.

The reaction of the U.S.

was minimal with the exception of public outcry in some areas.
56 Ibid.
57

John Holmes, "Canada and the Pacific", Pacific Affairs,
Vol. XLIV, No. 1, (1971), p. 13.

The
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status of Taiwan was settled when the Canadian government agreed to
take note of Peking's claim to the island.
entry into the U.N.

Canada favored Peking's

On the U.S. sponsored Important Questions

Resolution which would have required a two-thirds approval on entry,
Canada first abstained and later voted against the U.S.

In the U.N.,

Canada's support for the admission of Peking was lost to some extent
among the rising chorus clamoring for China's admission.
Thus, Canada's recognition of China has come at a time when U.S.
policy toward China had softened considerably.

Those who would call

the recognition of China the true test of Canadian independence must
bear in mind, that the establishment of diplomatic relations has come
when the reaction of the U.S. was perceived as harmless to Canada.
There was no counterweight.

As a result, the circumstances of world

politics and the steady U.S. opposition to Peking prevented Canada
from doing anything but laying the groundwork for the eventual big
step when it became possible.
Since the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the ending
of the U.S. policy of isolating China, the foreign policy contacts of
Canada to China stand to greatly increase.
In summarizing Asia, the economic importance of Japan was stressed
due to a phenomenal growth in Canadian-Japanese economic relations.
Japan is seen as an economic counterweight to the U.S. in both trade
and investment.

On the political plane, there have been no significant

developments between Canada and Japan.

There is a great potential

as Japan could assist Canada on such issues as disarmament and use of
the sea and other issues where the U.S. and Canada are in disagreement.
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Lorne Kavic also sees a great potential in the Japanese-Canadian
relationship:
Japan seems destined to be the focal
actor on the Pacific stage and the
development of even closer relations
with this dynamic power must be re
garded as a first priority for Canadian
attention as the nation proceeds to
take advanta e of its ringside ·seat on
the Pacific. 8

3

The issues concerning China were assessed and Canada was found
to be very much restrained by inflexibility of the policy of the U.S.
Since no countervailing forces were available to help Canada resist
diplomatic pressure of the U.S., Canada was confined to laying the
groundwork for eventual recognition when U.S. policy softened.

In

the late 1960's, the U.S. policy did soften toward China and Canada
capitalized on that moment to establish diplomatic relations with
Peking.
It is not clear what form a Canadian-Chinese relationship will
assume.

Detente in Southeast Asia and the Asian continent as a

whole cannot be achieved without some measure of cooperation from
the Chinese giant.
this premise.

Canadian initiatives will probably be based upon

Trade between Canada and China will increase, especially

grain deals which benefit Canada's Western provinces.

The use of

China as a counterweight will most likely come about in the U.S. or
some international body.

An actual pairing off such as Canada attempted

to do with the Soviet Union in Canada's disagreement with the U.S.
over the use of the Arctic is a long way off.
58 Lorne Kavic, -3?_. _ cit., p. 581.

95

Canada's search for detente and diversification of contacts
finds the same usefulness in the Pacific that it has found in the
Atlantic Community.
The Third World
The so-called Third World nations are caught in the challenge
of industrialization and modernization.

As such, their impact on

global developments is not gauged as significant as yet.
plenty of potential in the Third World.
but it is also in diplomatic strength.

There is

The potential is in conflict,
The Black African nations,

voting together in the U.N. General Assembly as a bloc, represent
formidable strength in the U.N.
Canada's enthusiastic acceptance of membership in the Commonwealth
and the French-Speaking Association enhance her contacts.

In addition,

Canada's past enables her to interact with the developing nations
without arousing suspision.

It is Canada which has a history free of

the smudges of imperialism and colonialism.

It was Canada who spoke

on behalf of the emerging nations at the beginning sessions of the
United Nations.
Canada's close contact with the developing nations is further
facilitated by her association in the British Commonwealth and her
association in the French-speaking counterpart.

The Commonwealth has

many advantages for Canada, as one analyst noted:
A Canada that requires external contacts
and an interdependent world, if it is to
enjoy any room for diplomatic manoeuvering
needs the Commonwealth's potential advantages
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to complement those of the United
Nations.59
Despite the advantages expressed in diplomatic maneuvering
Canada finds the Commonwealth and the Francophonie too loose and
heterogeneous to counterbalance the influence and pressure of the
U.S.

Since Canada does, however, find herself aligned with many

Third World nations on such issues as the use of the sea, disarmament,
and developmental assistance, the concept of multilateralism becomes
important.

Combination with many of the Third World nations on issues

in international commissions and forums may enable Canada to resist
the pressure of the United States.

John Holmes supports the use of

this concept.
An examination of the Canadian record in
the U.N., from the ending of the Korean
War to the present Canadian opposition in
the Geneva Disarmament Commission to the
U.S.-Soviet proposals on demilitarization
of the seabed suggests that combination
with other countries is an effective way
of resisting American policies.6 0
The independent view that Canada is able to articulate stems from the
multilateral approach.
In the U.N., opposition to the U.S. has been frequent among Third
World nations.

Canada has often sided with those nations.

Examples

59 K.A. MacKirdy, "The Commonwealth: Does It Exist?" Canadian
Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite? Edited by J.L.
Granatstein, (Toronto:Copp Clark Publishing Co., 1969), p. 167.
60 John Holmes, "Canada and the United States: Political and
Security Issues", Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3,
(1970), p. 412.
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are Canada's complete opposition to Aparthied in South Africa,
opposition to Portugal's continued colonial policies, and opposition
to the Rhodesian minority rule government.

61

The degree of U.S. and Canadian divergence varies on these issues,
but it is known that in the case of South Africa, Rhodesia, and
Portugal, U.S. opposition is not as extreme as that of Canada.
Canada's association in the Commonwealth and the Francophonie
allows for a symbiotic relationship.

Canada may use the strength

of multilateral association on objectives that Canada and the respective association may have in common.
serve to engender common policies.

In addition, common objectives

If Canada's distinct policy is in

accordance with the association's policy, the strength of multilateral
association and thus, numbers, will be enough to allow Canada to pursue
her distinct policy, even when it means opposition to the U.S.

Canada's

recent stand on the admission of The People's Republic of China to the
United Nations is an excellent illustration of this point.

The two

associations can make use of Canada as a mouthpiece to the more affluent
Western nations to articulate Third World grievances.

Many nations of

the Commonwealth and Francophonie are recipients of a rather generous
Canadian aid program about two billion dollars in the past twenty years. 62
Canada's interest in the Third World will also be facilitated
61 Roy A. Matthews, "Africa in Canadian Affairs", International
Journal, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, (1970-71), pp. 130-31.
62 Thomson and Swnnson, op. cit. p. 94.
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by her interest in minimizing the tensions of the conflict between
rich and poor nations.

The foreign policy review has noted63 the

importance and implications of the rich-poor nation conflict.
Trudeau has called for an expanded aid program on the part of
Canada as one means to reduce the tensions of the conflict of the
imbalance of rich and poor.
In summary, the experience of Canada in the U.N., the Commonwealth,
and the Francophonie suit Canada for continued interaction with the
developing nations.

It would seem that the strength of numbers gained

through multilateral association has allowed Canada to pursue her own
distinct policy even if the policy pits Canada in opposition to the
U.S.

The relationship also allows for Canada to serve several purposes

useful to the developing nations.

6 3 Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians,
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), p. 25.

CHAPTER V
Conclusions
This analysis has attempted to examine the various sectors of
Canadian foreign policy in order to determine the role of counter
vailing forces.

To some extent, the forces have been immersed in

a host of factors which interact to produce a foreign policy.

The

study concentrated itself on policy areas where countervailing forces
were readily available for examination and on areas where the counter
weights were not that available.
The starting point for this analysis was the regional power
distribution which finds the U.S. as the predominant force in the
Western Hemisphere.

All other nations in the Western Hemisphere are

subject to the power projections of the United States in varying degrees.
This has been the main obstacle to the total realization of Canadian
independence and sovereignty.

The influence and pressure of the

extensive bilateral relationships in economics, defense, and develop
mental projects are felt by Canadians to a much greater extent than the
Americans.
A tracing of the Canadian response to American pressure and world
developments showed that Canada's survival depended on constant
vigilance.

In the early days of the Canadian nation, pressure from

the American policy was great and at times, threatening.

The Canadian

policy was assured of its survival by maintaining the imperial
connection to Britain.

Close ties to the Mother Land enabled the
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British to underwrite Canadian survival.

Thus, Canada as Holmes

noted, " . . . .learned early to seek security by playing off one
great power against another.

111

Growing international trends toward regional organization have
begun to limit Canada's access to the European continent.

The

growing economic relationship with the U.S. subjects Canada to a
great deal of U.S. influence.

Canada has found that her traditional

obstacles to gravitation to the American orbit are not as strong as
they once were.

The existence of a strong French-speaking community

in Quebec has called for American assistance.

This certainly cannot

lead one to conclude that Canada's bilingual nature is becoming
Americanized, but it does subject the French-speaking community to
the same pressures that are felt in other parts of Canada where the
English-speaking residents allowed easy penetration.

As long as French

is dominant in Quebec, the American influence will be minimized, but
how long this can go on is purely a matter of conjecture.
In the 1960's, a surging nationalism in Canada has shown the
greatest promise of protecting sovereignty.

Canadian nationalists

have called for deliberate policy divergences from the U.S. and have
agitated for greater control of foreign---particularly U.S. businesses
operating in Canada.

Government investigative commissions have found

U.S. penetration into Canada in every walk of life to be extensive
and they have recommended ways in which Canada can work toward preserving
1 John Holmes, The Better Part� Valour: Essays on Canadian
Diplomacy, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd. 1970), p. 30.
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her independence.

High level consultations, called for on a

constant basis by the Canadian and American ambassadors will help
to ameliorate such things as the extraterritorial application of U.S.
Trading law to Canadian subsidiaries.
In Europe and particularly Britain, Canada has derived a measure
of counterbalance to the U.S.

Traditionally, this counterweight has

acted as a guarantee of Canadian independence.

Use of Britain as a

counterweight was the means Canada employed to insure her survival as
an independent nation.
As Europe moves toward greater regional organization, such as
Britain's entry to the EEC symbolizes, fears have been raised in the
minds of Canadians about being left to the North American continent and
the dominance of the U.S.

The Canadian government had anticipated the

events that led to Britain's entry into the EEC and attempted to
supplant the presence of Britain with a new expanded trade policy
toward Europe, inviting more markets and investment sources.

While

trade with several European nations increased substantially, it was
more than matched by the leaps and bounds that U.S. trade with Canada
took during the four year period under examination.
The leadership and many observers continue to be hopeful.

Plans

for expansion of trade with Europe have not been abandoned and chances
are that the Canadians will seek to continue to find ways in which
Europe will counterbalance Canada's ties to the U.S.
The Canadian leadership hopes that financial arrangements with the
European continent will redirect strong trade bonds to Europe and
stimulate greater European investment in Canada.

Both objectives will
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have the effect of reducing the influence and pressure that the
U.S. enjoys in Canada.

Canadian nationalists hope to end the vul

nerability Canada has resulting from the heavy and extreme involve
ment of the U.S. in Canadian business.
The effects of trade and investment policy when totally realized
can lead to trade patterns that will be stronger between Canada and
Europe, thus lessening Canada's dependence on the U.S. Dependence
assumes a degree of vulnerability and the Canadians wish to reduce both
vis-a-vis the U.S.

The counterweight of the European community is a

means to insure the realization of this objective.
Canada's political interest in Europe continues to be dominated
by her membership within NATO.

Canada hopes to see a further transfor

mation of the organization from a military to a more diplomatic alliance.
Canada hopes to use the obvious advantages of her NATO membership to
achieve three objectives.

One, she wishes to promote a detente in

Europe through the relaxation of tensions, accomplished through mutual
force reductions and the initiation of more communication and exchange
between the East and West.

Canada has already contributed to the new

atmosphere, by reducing and withdrawing a portion of her NATO commitment.
Secondly, Canada continues to seek a greater diversification of
contacts in Europe which heightens the possibility of new relationships.
Canada would hope to find among these new relationships, nations for
limited alignment on issues and policy matters where Canada and the
United States differ.

The Canadian position as a subordinate nation

within the Western Hemisphere's power distribution would be enhanced
and strengthened by the addition of supportive nations.
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Eastern Europe, with its drive toward a liberalized Communism,
has a very great potential in Canada's designs.
expansion of trade with the West.

East Europe seeks an

East Europe and particularly the

Soviet Union are seeking Western technological techniques and some
scientific innovation.

On the premise of trade, Canada would hope

to expand her relationships with Eastern Europe nations as part of
her overall strategy of diversifying Canadian contacts outside of the
Western Hemisphere.

The record is by no means clear enough for

sound predictions and analysis to take place at this point in time.
The third objective sought by Canada is the opportunity for
multilateral association with the NATO nations.

As discussed earlier,

multilateral association allows for Canada to escape the pressure of
many of her bilateral associations with the U.S., particularly in
regard to defense.
Thus, the European continent represents a great deal of use and
potential use for the Canadians in their drive to realize their
objectives.

The Canadian policy must be coherent and attuned to the

needs of Europe as well as the needs of Canada.
Britain has functioned traditionally as the counterweight to the
pressures Canada felt from the dominating United States.

Today, as

Britain is caught up in the trend toward regionalism on the Western
European continent, Canada has been moved to expand her contacts
with the continent as a whole to continue to enable a part of the
Atlantic European community to gain leverage for Canada as she works
against the restraints of the Western Hemispheric distribution of power
system.
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The interest of Canada in the Soviet Union as a counterweight
was examined in regard to the conflict of the U.S. and Canada over
the use of the Arctic Sea.

Canada had believed that vast Soviet

claims to the Arctic would give the Soviets a similar interest in
defining the use of the Arctic Sea.
aloof from the conflict.

The Soviets preferred to stay

But here is an excellent example of Canada's

attempt to alter the distribution of power distribution between her
self and the United States by the introduction of a third party into
the conflict.

Canada very clearly followed the strategy of attempting

to acquire another nation as a temporary limited alignment.
Canada's interest in Latin America was examined.

The c�ucial

points of Canada's interest in Latin America have been the status of
Canada within the Organization of American States and Canada's con
tinuing relations with Castro's Cuba.

Despite U.S. opposition,

Canada has continued diplomatic and trade exchanges with Castro's
Cuba.
Canada opposes taking on membership in the OAS because she sees
the organization as dominated by the U.S.

Because of that arrangement,

Canada remains outside the OAS and enjoys a greater latitude in hemi
spheric affairs such as developmental assistance and the extension and
continuation of protocol with Cuba.
Canada had no counterweights during the Cuban missile crisis and
when she was subjected to U.S. diplomatic pressure, she resisted U.S.
demands that she alert her troops and join the embargo.

This is

perhaps the only area where this study has seen an independent policy
fully achieved without any counterweights to offset the distribution of
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power in the West.
Canada has achieved policy divergences from the U.S. on Latin
American matters because of restraint on the part of the U.S. and
because of the special circumstances of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The question of Cuba has become more related to Canada's
refusal to join the OAS.

Trudeau himself has stated that when Canada

sees a change in the hemispheric relationships with Cuba, she will
give more favorable consideration to the question of joining the OAS.
Latin America and Canada will find much benefit in enlarging
their relations.

Perhaps the most benefit will lay in Canada and

the Latin American nations finding a way to moderate or reduce the
power projections of the U.S. throughout this hemisphere.
Canada's interests in Asia are centered on Japan and China.
There are other associations, such as the Commonwealth links to New
Zealand and Australia.

But the economic and growing political relation

ship with Japan has occupied a great deal of Canada's attention.
Japanese trade is large and growing to the point that it challenges
Great Britain as Canada's second largest trading partner.

The

Japanese investment in Canada is also rapidly growing. Many Canadians
take comfort in this rapid growth.
They see it as another diversification of foreign investment,
thus diluting the influence of the United States.

As an economic

counterweight, Japan serves the function of challenging U.S. business
in Canada.
In asia, Canada can and is finding a whole new range of opportunities.
The use of Japan transends the economic realm.

As a supportive nation,
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Japan, like Canada, claims a certain part of the sea as territorial
waters.

Japan has also worked in the forefront for disarmament.

In

both areas, Canada can find a potential source for limited alignment
against the policy of the U.S.
Canada's disagreement with the U.S. over China was examined.
The war in Korea found the U.S. and Canada in disagreement over
strategy and the economic embargo.
loath to impose an embargo.

The Canadians were once again

U.S. pressure finally convinced the

Canadians, during the Korean Conflict, to cut off trade ties with
Peking.

Shortly after the war until 1963, several trade agreements

between Canada and Peking were interrupted by the application of the
U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act.

Canada was directly affected by the

power projections of the U.S. and was restrained from following a
desired policy direction.
The issue of recognition of China was examined and it was
contended that without the acquisition of a strong ally or a third
party to act as a counterweight to U.S. pressure, Canada was restrained
from recognizing China until the recent relaxation in the U.S. hardline
toward China.

At best, Canada was able only to maintain some remnants

of communication and lay the groundwork for the time when she would
be able to take the step of recognition.

Now, Canada is expanding her

ties with China.
China's promise to be a political counterweight is not clear.
Although China can be expected to oppose the U.S. on many issues,
particularly the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia, the issues may not
always be the sort with which the U.S. and Canada are in disagreement.
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Thus, China's use as a counterweight clearly cannot yet be established.
The government's review of foreign policy anticipated policy
divergences from the U.S. on matters pertaining to Asia.

If these

divergences are of great importance, then the need for counterweights
is clearly established.

China is a possibility that the Canadians are

getting to know; Japan is a p�obability that Canadians do much business
with.
The role of the Third World was seen within the context of
Canadian plans.

Canada can seek combination with many of the emerging

nations in international forums and commissions to influence or resist
U.S. policy.

There is an incomplete picture of the developing nations

at the moment, due to their strong neutrality.

Canada's policy toward

them must be neighborly if they are to hold any promise for Canada,
as political counterweights.
Pierre Trudeau's new energies in seeking countervailing forces to
the United States underlies the government's belief in this traditional
practice of offsetting the dynamic presence of the U.S.
promised a continuation in this direction.

Trudeau has

Many nations and groups

of nations can be considered a potential counterweights, depending on
the issues at hand and the circumstances that surround those issues.
Canada's practice of constant vigilance is necessary if she is to remain
independent and sovereign, a creditable governing unit in the eyes of
the world.

This time, her vigilance must be geared toward the array

of issues and particularly those in which she and the U.S. have
strong interests.
In foreign policy, Canada, as evidenced by Trudeau's direction,
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continues to embrace the concept of the counterweight to enable
Canada to follow her own aspirations.

It is the conclusion of this

analysis that countervailing forces to American influence are very
important to the realization of Canadian objectives---complete
sovereignty and independence.

But countervailing forces are not, as

the study has shown, the only means by which independent policy is
pursued.

As a useful concept, the countervailing force is only one

of an array of factors which enable Canada to pursue its own policy.
The cases show that when no counterweight was available, Canada was
more susceptible to U.S. influence and restrains as in China.

Where

no counterweights can enter the situation, Canada is more likely
not to diverge too dramatically from the policy of the U.S.
Many of the cases examined found nations with whom Canada is
just beginning to develop relations.
potential countervailing forces.

These can only be regarded as

They may in the long run enable Canada

to realize one of her own policy objectives through a multilateral
setting.
In light of the evidence and data examined, several things become
clear about Canada and her attempts to strengthen her sovereignty and
independence in the U.S. dominated distribution of power system in the
Western Hemisphere.

The U.S. power projections are strong enough and

effective enough to interrupt Canadian policy or at least subject the
Canadians to a great deal of pressure.

In many cases, the threat of

U.S. retaliation and the degree of Canadian vulnerability take on a
relationship basis in the minds of Canadian nationalists.
It seems certain that the U.S. is beyond the stage where she
would intervene militarily in Canada unless extreme circumstances prevailed.
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Canada need not expect economic embargoes to be applied when she
diverges too radically from the U.S., however, the threat of U.S.
economic retaliation and the Canadian vulnerability to the U.S. in
this area may serve to keep Canada within a realm considered acceptable
by the U.S.
Canada, is subjected to a third means of gaining policy com
pliance and that is persuasion tactics usually employed at high level
consultations.

In the case of Cuba, persuasion tactics at a high level

were the main instruments employed by the U.S.
takes on a relevance.

The use of threats also

Canadian fears of U.S. retaliation can certainly

figure into policy-making considerations.
There is not always consensus in the Western Hemisphere.

The

domineering presence of the U.S. contributes a great deal toward con
sensus.

It must be assumed, however, that different historical develop

ments and clifferent political systems condition different policies and
approaches.

It is because of this point, that an objective of many

subordinate nations in a sphere of influence is the pursuance of a
distinct policy as conditioned by goals, aspirations, the political
system, and other political realities of the given policy without
interference from the dominant power.
In the Western Hemisphere, many of the subordinate nations are not
subjected to great degrees of U.S. pressure and influence, but Canada,
owing to her special extensive relationship with the U.S. is subjected
to the pressures from the U.S.
strengthen her sovereignty,

Because of this and Canada's desire to

Canada must find ways to increase her

power vis-a-vis the United States.
such means.

The Hartmann study showed four
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The first was the acquisition of allies which is perhaps the most
useful tactic of the Canadian political system.

As an ally, Britain

has guaranteed the survival of the Canadian state.

Today, Canada

looks to Europe for continuing counterbalance in the economic and
political sphere.

Canada also looks to Asia, and particularly Japan

for the same assistance.

The Trudeau formula has been to diversify

Canada's contacts and be in a position to enlist the aid of a third
party when introduction of a counterwe±ght to the U.S. is needed.
The second strategy outlined by Hartmann was the acquisition
of territories.

Within the sphere of influence and distribution of

power system, this tactic is cast in doubt.

In addition, no territories

are available and even if they were, Canada's ability to acquire them
is virtually nonexistent.

Canada has, in what may seem to be an

extreme application, moved to protect her Arctic region from U.S. use
as a means of strengthening her sovereignty, particularly in the North.
A third strategy, that of erecting buffer states is clearly out of
the question.

This strategy of the Hartmann theory can find no appli

cation in the distribution of power as it exists within the Western
Hemisphere.

It is conceivable in power distributions where there are

states of roughly the same power competing for the advantage, but that
example is far removed from the situation that exists in the Western
Hemisphere.
A fourth strategy, that of undermining the strength of the U.S.
may be employed by Canada.
is Canada.

Perhaps the most loyal ally the U.S. has

Canada's refusal to support a given U.S. policy may

detract from the merits of the policy in question at the onset.
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Multilateral opposition to a U.S. policy or strategy is Canada's
most effective way of undermining U.S. strength, particularly within
the U.S. sphere of influence.
There are several limitations to the Trudeau ideas of seeking
greater contacts and diversification of contacts.

These limitations

will be strong factors in the eventual failure br success of the
Canadian political system to achieve its objectives.

The first

limitation stems directly from the predominant position of the United
States in the Western Hemisphere's distribution of power.

The over

whelming economic and military power of the United States can serve
as the means to compel the acceptable degree of policy compliance.
The power distribution of the Western Hemisphere clearly marks the
dominant and subordinate nations.

Any divergence of a radical nature

on policy between the U.S. and the subordinate nations must be defined
within the bounds of what the U.S. sees as acceptable.

There is no

nation in the Western Hemisphere which can completely escape the power
projections of the United States.
A second limitation is the degree of support that a nation in a
temporary limited alignment can provide Canada.

When pitted against

the enormous strength of the United States, only the Soviet Union and
possibly the People's Republic of China could hope to match raw physical
power against the U.S.

These two nations have not been willing to get

involved in the differences that exist between the U.S. and Canada.
The type of support that Canada can hope to obtain is diplomatic support
in international forums and multilateral conferences.

This support

becomes crucial in many world developments, but in matters of direct
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confrontation, which admittedly are few and far between, no nation
equal to the U.S. in size and strength would be inclined to get in
volved.
A third limitation involves itself with ownership of Canadian
industry and the extensive economic relationship with the U.S.

It

has been detailed how extensive U.S. ownership of certain Canadian
industries actually is.

The desire of Canada to seek re-direction

in her trade patterns and diversification of her investment sources
depends on the willingness of these new sources to promote a constant
expansion of the Canadian industrial sector and economy and to even
tually outdistance the growth of the economic ties already existing
between the U.S. and Canada.

Such a commitment would require massive

doses of Europe and Japanese money.

Canada's ability to attract this

investment depends on her attractiveness to European and Japanese
markets and investors.

Canada is only one-third developed, and very

rich in mineral resources.

As such, she will become more attractive

as other mineral rich areas become depleted or unreliable.

It may

then depend on the willingness of other nations to compete with the
U.S. for Canadian resources.
The successes of the Canadian policy of creating countervailing
forces are notable.

First of all, Britain as a counterweight enabled

Canada to resist union with the U.S. and to develop into a governing
unit separate from the U.S.

Two, multilateral association allowed

Canada to maintain the remnants of a policy toward China, which laid
the groundwork for eventual recognition.

The strength of numbers in

the U.N. allowed for Canadian opposition to the U.S. on the recent
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admission of Peking to the U.N.
Third, Canada was able to define and protect her Artie seas
from encroachments by the U.S.

A temporary limited alignment was

sought with the Soviets, but they refused to get involved.

Canada's

readiness to involve the Soviets is an excellent illustration of
limited alignment as a feasible Canadian policy.

Canada has promised

the U.S. that she will negotiate the problem within a multilateral
as opposed to a bilateral setting.

Once again, Canada seeks to

strengthen her power capacity through the strength of numbers.
Fourth, by remaining outside the OAS, Canada has been able to
maintain a diplomatic protocol with Castro's Cuba.

The Canadian

leadership believes that membership within the OAS would subject
Canada to further restraints on her freedom to operate independently
within this hemisphere.

This action stems from the Canadian premise

that the OAS is a U.S.-dominated organization.
Five, Canada has accomplished the beginnings of a diversification
of trade patterns and investment sources which will ultimately reduce
Canadian vulnerability to U.S. economic measures and will dilute the
preponderant influence of the U.S. in Canadian economic and political
affairs.
Sixth, the Trudeau idea has opened up new contacts with areas,
that Canada has traditionally had little connection with.

Diversifi

cation of contacts has opened up new relationships with the nations of
Latin America, with Japan, and with the Soviet Union.

Strong political

and economic ties, depending on the area, can further assist Canada in
the attaining of her objectives.
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A greater array of contacts can widen the Canadian strategy
range beyond those power increases described by Hartmann.

Canada's

preference for multilateral settings is an example of this.
Returning to Hartmann's strategies, the first, that of acquiring
limited alignments on political issues and more permanent alignments
with Europe and Japan on economic matters, have·been successful toward
altering the restraints felt by Canada as a subordinate nation within
the power distribution.

This is the step toward realizing the most

important Canadian objective, that of the pursuance of her own distinct
independent policy as a sovereign governing entity.
Therefore, Trudeau has taken a correct step in assuming that
countervailing forces will allow Canada to pursue her national interest
and independent Canadian foreign policy.

Trudeau's trips to many

different areas of the world have been evidence of his faith in this
strategy.
As with many endeavors, future political analysts may look back
and proclaim the wisdom or folly of such policies.

Canada's final

judgment of her current directions resets somewhere well into the
future.

For the moment, this analysis has demonstrated that she is

moving in the right direction if she is to increase her independence
from the U.S. and from the restraints of the sphere of influence.
Canada's search and use of countervailing forces takes place in
a time which has witnessed the disintegration of the bipolar world
into a multipolar community in which polycentrism has been promoted.
The evidence seems to indicate that the restraints on subordinate nations
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within power distribution systems in a bipolar setting are far more
restrictive than the present day.

Thus, Canada's policy of seeking

counterweights to the U.S. is greatly aided by the drift of the
nation-state system to multipolar alignments.
The more restrictive setting of bipolar confrontation such as
the world witnessed in the post World war II times placed more re
strictions on the movements of subordinate nations.

In addition, the

congruity of interests between the U.S. and Canada placed more re
strictions on Canada during this earlier period.
The world is different now.
has, in large measure, passed on.

The great ideological confrontation
The nation-state community now

hosts alignments of Connnunist, Western, and the so-called Third World
nations.
In addition, the economic problems of all three blocs have turned
their attention to economic solutions.

Cooperation among nations is

one way to immediately start on the path to the economic betterment of
those nations afflicted.
Thus, the disintegration of the bipolar world, the rise of multi
polar alignments, and world wide economic difficulties have turned the
nation-state system away from the confrontation politics of the Cold
War.

Canada seeks to take advantage of the new flexibility to attempt

to satisfy the nationalist aspirations of her populace.
It is not wise to lose sight of the great congruity of interests
that has bound and continues to bind the U.S. and Canada to their
very extensive relationship.

These interests will maintain the
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relationship, but the Canadian government must take note of those
it governs.

The aspirations of the people are to maintain and

reinforce Canadian sovereignty.

If the government of Canada is

to survive, it must continue to devise and formulate policy which
has as its goal the realization of that objective.
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